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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study analyzes what the Montana supreme court
has said about the office and powers of the Montana
governor.

It examines what the judges have said the gover

nor can or cannot do, and seeks to determine whether the
court through its decisions has strengthened or weakened
the office and powers of the governor.

The focus of the

study is on the mode of interpretation used by the court
to resolve questions concerning the governor’s office and
powers when it lacks clear and definite constitutional or
statutory direction.

Since 1920, there has been increasing

recognition of the need to have a strong executive in
state government.

The hypothesis of this study is that

the Montana supreme court, when presented with a situation
wherein the constitution or statute lacks prima facie
clarity concerning the powers of the governor, should exer
cise a mode of judicial interpretation consistent with
strengthening the office and powers of the governor.
The study is justifiable for two reasons.
attempts to prove or disprove the hypothesis.

It

But the more

important reason is that in the next decade the fate of the
1
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50 states as elements of the American federal system will
depend upon how the 50 governors exercise their official
and unofficial powers.

We must understand every aspect

of the governors’ office and powers, including what state
supreme courts are deciding with regard to them»
The Office and Powers of the
Montana Governor
It is necessary at the outset to discuss two basic
questions concerning executive behavior.

First, what ic

the office and what are powers of the Montana governor?
Second, what identifies a strong governorship?
The office of governor is the highest elective
executive position in Montana state government, with tenure
for four years and various executive duties and responsl=
bilities.

In Montana, the office of governor exists so

that the "supreme executive power of the state" can be
vested in one executive officer whose responsibility is
to "see that the laws are faithfully executed."

Conse

quently, more executive power rests in the office of gover
nor than in any other executive office.
The powers of the Montana governor are both consti
tutional and statutory; for the purposes of this study, the
constitutional powers are more important.

Some of the more

^Mont. Const., Art, VII, sec. 5
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important powers which this study reviews and considers
include: the appointment and removal powers, the approval
and veto powers, the pardon power, the militia power, the
proclamation power (covering both elections and extra
ordinary sessions), the right to succession, the power to
call in a district judge, the power to approve state con
tracts and the discretionary extradition powero

This study

does not undertake a comprehensive examination of all the
governor’s powers; it is an analysis only of those powers
which have occasioned a judicial test before the Montana
high court.
The governor’s office combined with his powers
creates the executive function, about which two schools of
thought may be identified: the literalist school, and the
o
stewardship school.
The literalist school holds that the
executive ’’can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and
reasonably traced to some specific grant of power or justly
implied and included within such express grant as proper and
necessary to its exercise” ; whereas, the stewardship school
holds that the executive could ”do anything that the needs
of the nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by
the constitution or by the l a w s . ”3

Between these two

^These two schools of thought are usually discussed
with reference to the presidential executive function.
3Louis W. Koenig, The Chief Executive (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., I964), pp. 13-14.
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schools of thought, and with reference to their applica
tion to the executive function in Montana government, the
literalist view is preferred in this study, since it is
more consistent with the spirit of the executive article
of the Montana constitution.

Recognizing that in consti

tutional theory the national constitution grants presiden
tial authority while a state constitution restricts guber
natorial authority, Koenig^s distinction between a
literalist and stewardship mode of interpretation is sug
gestive that something like the literalist or strict mode
of interpretation seems consistent with the spirit of the
Montana executive article.
The Concept of a Strong Governor
A strong governor is a state chief executive who
brings masterful leadership to the exercise of substantial
formal powers, responsibilities and organizational devices,
such as (1) a single or near single (non-plural) executive,
(2) broad appointment and removal powers,

(3) four-year

tenure with re-election permitted, (4) an executive bud
get, (5) a veto power, (6) discretionary administrative
decision-making power and (7) an emergency or crisis power.
These are not the only powers, responsibilities and devices
which contribute to a strong governorship; they illustrate
the concept of a strong governor as used in this study.
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Many other factors may contribute to the final
product of a strong governorship, such as self-confidence
and effective personality traits.

Certain important

qualities, powers and devices will not always create and
constitute a strong governorship.

A good example to illus

trate this point is a study which chose four criteria as
indices and concluded that Montana had a strong governor
ship when, in fact, the Montana governorship is far from
strong.^
Once a strong governorship is created, what are
some of the examples of leadership in the execution of the
laws and the exercise of its powers?

Among other things,

the governor will desire and seek a strong legislature and
judiciary.

He will exercise his policy formation power In

the legislature,^

He will recognize administrative pro b -

l e m s , and will be able to marshal the executive branch to
meet and resolve them.

He will resort to quick but just

action in time of emergencies to keep order.

He will

inspire his fellow citizens to participate in government,
and he will be imaginative and alert.

Again, these are

^See Joseph A, Schlesinger, "The Politics of the
Executive," Politics in the American States, e d , Herbert
Jacob and Kenneth N, Vines (Boston” Little, Brown and
Company, 1965), pp, 217-234»
5See Coleman B„ Ransone, Jr., The Office of Governo:
in the United States (University, Alabama : University of
Alabama Press, 1956), chap, 7,
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only a few examples of uses of leadership inherent in a
strong governor.
To place this study in historical perspective, it
must be noted that the concept of a strong governorship is
relatively new, and that the initial conception of the
Montana governorship was that of a weak executive.
Nationally, the movement for achieving and implementing a
strong governorship began around 1920, and was given impetus
by the recommendations of the various ”little Hoover Commis
sions.”

In the beginning of state government, the governor

was nothing more than a figurehead.^

Even Montana’s con

stitutional draftsmen, in 1889» seem to have regarded the
governorship as "almost a sinecure" and "more of an orna
ment than anything else."^

But much has happened in state

government since then to modify earlier attitudes, and
state courts, as instruments of state government, cannot
have escaped the impact of these developments on their modes
of interpretation.
Today the governor is the most powerful member of
the executive branch, which is considered an equal to the
state legislature

or judiciary.

For the achievement and

^See Leslie Lipson, The American Governor from
Figurehead to Leader (Chicago! University of Chicago
Press, 1939), c h a p . 2.
7proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Con
vention. 1889 (H e l e n a : S t a t e Publishing Company, 1921),
p. 442.
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utilization of a strong governorship the Montana supreme
court should exercise a mode of interpretation consistent
with this concept.
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CHAPTER II
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EXECUTIVE
FUNCTION BY MANDAMUS
Introduction
Mandamus may be defined as a command from a court
of law directed to some legal entity compelling the per
formance of a duty required by law.

In Montana the office

of governor is political and vests discretionary power in
the chief executive, and since the office requires the
exercise of discretion, the courts have held that mandamus
cannot be issued against the governor to compel him to per
form the executive function so long as he observes the laws
and acts within the limits of his power and authority.
However, there is one significant exception to this rule,
which provides that the courts do have a judicial super
visory power over the state executive to compel him to per
form a purely ministerial act which comprehends a function
of simple obedience or service.
A discretionary act is an act which the governor
may or may not perform since he has the authority to make
choices and decisions regarding the act; a ministerial act
is an act which the governor must perform, since by
8
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9
nature

this kind of act neither involves the use of dis

cretion nor the opportunity to make choices.

An example

of a discretionary act would be the governor* s exercise of
his authority to determine whether or not to extradite a
fugitive from justice; an example of a ministerial act
would be the governor*s obligation to issue a commission
upon the happening of an event.

Thus, where the nature of

the act to be compelled is discretionary, the courts have
no judicial control by mandamus over the governor*s per
formance of the executive function; however, where the
nature of the act is ministerial, the courts do have
authority to compel the governor to perform the act.^
Two of the three Montana decisions about the manda
mus power have cited a fundamental federal constitutional
case--Marbury v, Madison,

2

Citation of this case by the

Montana court raises the question how persuasive a federal
decision should be in a state supreme court,

A federal

decision probably should not be very persuasive on the issue
of the use of mandamus to compel gubernatorial performance
of an act since the nature and source of presidential power
from the federal constitution is fundamentally different
^For an additional discussion of this point see
notes in 33 Am, Dec. 361 (1839) and 31 Am. St. Rep. 294
(1Ô92), plus 34 Am, Jur,, Mandamus secs. 134, 133»
2l Cranch 137 (1803).
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10
from the nature and source of gubernatorial power from the
state constitution «

The Montana supreme court failed to

acknowledge this fundamental difference between the two
executive functions as it cited the Marbury case for sup
port of its own decisions,
Montana Decisions
On three different occasions the Montana supreme
court has discussed whether the Montana governor in the
performance of the executive function can be controlled by
the judiciary through the use of the writ of mandamus.

In

all three cases the issue specifically before the court was
whether mandamus could be used to compel the governor to
act, and in two of the three cases the Montana court in
deciding the issue cited Marbury v, Madison,^
^1 Cranch 137 (1Ô03), In this famous decision ^
Chief Justice Marshall defined the distinction between
discretionary and ministerial acts: "It is said that those
powers which are entrusted to the executive discretion, are
not subject to the control of judicial authority. They are
exclusively political. They respect general and not indi
vidual rights, and, being entrusted to the executive, his
decision is conclusive. The acts of the secretary of state,
so far as he is the agent of the executive in the exercise
of his discretionary powers, are not examinable by the
courts. But, when the legislature proceeds to impose on
that officer other duties; when the rights of individuals
are dependent on the performance of those acts, he is to
that extent the officer of the law, is amenable to the law
for his conduct, and can not at his discretion sport away
the vested rights of others. It is not by the office of the
person to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of the
thing to be done, that the propriety or impropriety of
issuing a mandamus is to be determined,"
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Cases from the Territorial Period
The Chumasero Case
Chumasero v. Potts^ held that the governor could be
compelled by mandamus to perform a ministerial act--to sit
as a member of a canvassing board to canvass the vote of
the people when it was his statutory obligation to do so*
Chumasero, an attorney residing in Helena and an
elector of the territory, sought a writ of mandamus to issue
against Governor Potts and other state officers to compel
them to canvass all the votes of the August 1874 election
upon the question of removing the seat of the territorial
government from Virginia City to Helena.

The governor

responded (1) that no one had demanded or requested him to
conduct the canvass and that there was no default or
refusal by him to conduct the canvass ; therefore (2) the
court had no authority to control the action of the execu
tive by mandamus.
With reference to the governor’s first argument,
Chief Justice Wade in his majority opinion made a distinc
tion "between duties of a public nature and those of a
mere private character," and ruled that in those instances
involving a public duty "there is no necessity for a demand
and r e f u s a l , "5

«Where the duty is required to be performed

42 Mont. 242 (l8?5),
^2 Mont. 255.
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by the law and is of a public nature, the law is a sufficient demand, and an omission to perform is a refusal n6
Concerning the governor's second argument, Chief
Justice Wade held "that the execut^^ve may be compelled to
perform an act clearly ministerial in its nature, and
neither involves any discretion nor leaves any alterna
tive."^

Referring to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in

Marbury v* Madison,

Chief Justice Wade stated

. . . the propriety of the writ is not to be
determined by the fact that it is demanded
against the executive, but by the nature of
the act required of the executive to perform.
And looking into the nature of the act, we
say it is purely ministerial, and is absolutely
defined by the law, and hence that the action
2 Mont, 255• The statute which conferred this duty
on the governor was a territorial enactment titled "An Act
to change the seat of government of the Territory of Montana*
which provided that the canvass of votes on the question of
changing the seat of government should be conducted in the
same manner as provided for canvassing the votes for the
delegate to Congress, The legislation providing for canvas
sing the congressional delegate's votes was "An Act Relative
to Elections," section 29 of the Laws of the Territory of
Montana (1Ô64- .5)» which provided in part :
, , , and it
shall be the duty of the secretary of the Territory, with
the marshall of the Territory or his deputy, in the presence
of the governor, to proceed within thirty days after the
election , , , to canvass the votes, , , ,
^2 Mont, 256,
1 Cranch 137 (1803 ) » At one point in his opinion,,
Chief Justice Wade made an analogy between the fact of this
case and the facts of the Marbury case, and stated that "th e
acts of the commissioners in canvassing
_ the vote were purely
of a ministerial character, like that of adding a column of
figures or of the issuing of a commission to an officer duly
elected to an office," 2 Mont 256,
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of the executive in this regard may be
controlled by mandamus,9
Justice Servis, dissenting, thought that a demand
and default were necessary, and argued that before a writ
of mandamus could be issued against the governor, there
must be a demand by the plaintiff and a default by the
governor.

He maintained that since neither demand nor

default was alleged in the pleadings nor proven, the
governor could not be compelled to procure and canvass the
abstract of the votes.
The Tanner Case
Territory ex rel. Tanner v. Potts

10

stated, as

dictum, that mandamus was the proper remedy to compel the
governor to audit and allow a claim for expenses and for
compensation by a person acting as an appointee of the
governor.
Tanner had been appointed by Governor Potts as a
"messenger” to arrest and return a fugitive from justice.
He was not successful in his mission and, three years
later, sought by mandamus to compel the governor to honor
his claim for expenses incurred while acting as messenger.
Justice Knowles held that Tanner had waited too
long before bringing his action in mandamus and, therefore.
92 Mont. 256.
^^3 Mont. 364 (1879).
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could not compel the governor to audit and allow the claim
of expenses.

The court, however, stated as dictum that

the governor in such a case "acts as an auditing officer
and not in an executive capacity" and, therefore, "an
application for a writ of mandate to compel him to pro
ceed and audit a claim for such services and determine to
his satisfaction how much would be just and reasonable,
if made in due time, should be entertained."

But the court

could not "dictate to the governor what would be a just
and reasonable compensation for such services," since "the
determination of this rests in his discretion."^^
The State Publishing Company Case
State ex rel. State Publishing Co, v. Sraith^^ held
that the governor's duty to approve a contract let by the
board of examiners, on which he sat ex officio, was not
ministerial but involved discretion.
The state board of examiners, composed of the
governor and two other elected state executive officers, had
awarded a printing contract to the State Publishing Company
subject to approval by the governor and the treasurer;
however, Governor Smith and the treasurer refused to approve

^ ^3 Mont, 369.
^^23 Mont, 44, 57 P, 449 (1899).
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the contract»

i3

The State Publishing Company maintained

(1) that the governor's refusal to approve the contract wa;
arbitrary and without reason, and (2) that the governor's
duty to approve the contract was purely a ministerial act
which could be enforced by a writ of mandamus»
Chief Justice Brantly, after reviewing the Chuma
sero and Tanner cases, held that "the state executive,
when acting in a ministerial capacity only, and in matters
not involving executive judgment and discretion, may be
controlled by this writ »"^^

However, he did not believe

that approval in this case was a ministerial act; instead,
he believed that the governor and the treasurer in the dis
charge of their duties "must use their judgment and dis
cretion as to all matters into which the board could or
should inquire."

The court held that the governor's ace

was more than ministerial, and could not be controlled by
mandamus »

^^In the court's opinion, Chief Justice Brantly com
mented on the strange procedure used by state executive
officials to approve such contracts:
"It may be unfortunate
that the governor was made a member of this board whose duty
it is to let these contracts » It puts him in a position
where he can refuse to approve the action of a majority of
the board of which he is a member, and thus put his veto
upon proceedings in which he takes part," 23 Mont, 50,
^^23 Mont, 50,
^^23 Mont, 51.
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Summary
The Montana governor, by constitution and statute,
is invested with certain important executive functions, and
the performance of these functions depends in part on his
honesty, judgment and discretion.

With reference to those

functions which are entirely political in nature or require
the exercise of official judgment or discretion, the Mon
tana supreme court has consistently held that these execu
tive functions performed by the governor cannot be con
trolled by mandamus.

However, on the other hand, the Mon

tana court has held that executive functions or actions
which are purely ministerial can be controlled by mandamus.
On three early occasions, the territorial or state
supreme court was asked to reverse, by mandamus, actions
involving the governor?s executive discretion: to canvass
results of the election to determine the location of the
capital; to honor an appointee’s claim for compensation;
and to award a state contract.

In the canvass case, the

court found a clear "public duty” imposed on the governor
by statute and awarded the writ.

In the compensation case,

the issue was mooted by a lapse of time, but the court’s
dictum indicated that mandamus would have issued to compel
payment of a valid claim that was timely made.

In the

state contract case, the court thought that a curious
statutory provision providing for gubernatorial review of a
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board decision implied that executive discretion existed
and denied mandamuse
The territorial court thus established its avail
ability to review essentially executive decisions of the
governor and to substitute its own judgment for the
governor’s as to the difference between ’’ministerial" and
"discretionary" functions.

In addition, the early state

case, although not awarding mandamus, cited the territorial
decisions as relevant and possibly persuasivec

It must be

recognized that the determination whether an act is minis
terial or discretionary is in itself in some measure a
political decisiono

But proper judicial concern for execu

tive authority implies recognition of this fact and would
hopefully resolve doubtful instances in favor of executive
discretion, rather than to award mandamus «
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CHAPTER III
THE POWER TO APPOINT AND REMOVE
PUBLIC OFFICERS
This chapter analyzes what the Montana supreme court
has said about the governor^s exercise of his appointment
and removal power in creating a body of officials through
whom he can act.

What is the scope of the governor's power

to appoint to office?

What is the scope of the governor^ s

power to remove appointees?

To what extent are these powers

subject to judicial review?
The Appointment Power
One of the first tasks of the Montana governor after
taking the oath of office is to create a body of officials
through whom he can act.

This partly consists of selecting

his personal staff, appointing non-elective department
heads, and filling vacancies by appointment in the various
boards and commissions.
The Montana governor's appointment power is founded
on Article V ll, section 7> of the state constitution:
The governor shall nominate, and by and with
the consent of the senate, appoint all officers
whose offices are established by this constitu
tion, or which may be created by law, and whose
1Ô
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appointment or election is not otherwise
provided for. . . .1
Within this general constitutional grant of authority,
statutes and judicial decisions further define and limit
the exercise of this appointment power.
The Power to Fill Vacancies
What Constitutes a Vacancy?
The Neill Case.--The Montana supreme court has
twice discussed the governor's appointment power to fill
vacancies, and both times the crucial question was whether
a vacancy existed. An early case, State ex rel. Neill v.
2
Page, held that a voluntary resignation before the end of
an appointee*s term created a vacancy so that the governor
could make an appointment to fill the vacancy.
On July 31» 1Ô95» the governor appointed Page to be
state land agent, and on the same day Page was confirmed by
the state board of land examiners in accordance with a
statute.^

Two years later, in 1897» the governor requested

Page’s resignation which he tendered and the governor
accepted to take effect on August 7» 1897.

On August 9»

1Ô97, the governor, claiming that there was vacancy,
^Mont, Const., Art. VII, sec. 7.
^20 Mont. 238, 50 P. 719 (1897).
^Mont, Codes Ann. sec. 470 (Booth 1895)» amended
by 1Ô97 Laws, pp. 104-105.
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appointed Neill but the secretary of state refused to
countersign Neill^s commission since he believed that
Neill^ s appointment had to be approved by the state board
of land examiners.
The court recognized two issues in the case:
first, whether there was a vacancy created by the gover
nor *s acceptance of Pagers resignation, and second, if so,
who had the power to fill the vacancy.

With reference to

the first issue, the court noted a general statutory pro
vision that resignation would vacate an o f f i c e a n d ruled
that a vacancy was created by Page* s voluntary resignation
and the governor*s acceptance of it.

The court held that

a resignation before the expiration of a term meant **a
resignation before the end of a fixed time, or before the
expiration of the time during which an official has the
right to serve.’*^
A vacancy existing, the governor could appoint to
fill it under authority of a statute which provided that :
When any office becomes vacant, and no mode
is provided by law for filling such vacancy, the
^Mont. Codes Ann., sec. 1101 (Booth 1895). An
office becomes vacant on the happening of either of the
following events before the expiration of the term:
1 , The death of the incumbent, 2. His insanity, . . ,
3. His resignation. . . .
^20 Mont. 246.
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Governor must fill such vacancy by granting a
commission to expire at the end of the next
Legislative Assembly or at the next election
by the people,o
7
The Jardine Case.--State ex rel. Jardine v. Ford,
held that a voluntary retirement had the same effect as a
resignation, and thereby created a vacancy to be filled by
the governor.
On December 31, 1947» Judge Ewing, who had been
elected to a four-year term as district judge, notified
the governor that he was retiring at midnight that night.
In contemplation of the judge’s retirement, the governor
requested an advisory opinion from the attorney general
whether there would be a vacancy in the office of district
judge upon Judge Ewing’s retirement.

The attorney general

advised the governor that either of two statutory provi
sions might govern the situation: one concerning ’’resigna
tion,” and the other concerning the judge’s ’’ceasing to
à
discharge the duty of his office,”
The attorney general
^ o n t . Codes Ann., sec. 1104 (Booth 1Ô95)* This
statute remains in effect as Mont. Rev. Codes, sec. 59-605
(1947).
*^120 Mont. 507» 188 P.2d 422 (1948) .
^Mont. Rev. Codes, sec. 511 (1935). This statute
provided that ’’An office becomes vacant on the happening
of either of the following events before the expiration of
the terra:” death, insanity, ”3. His resignation," removal,
non-residency, absence from the state, ”7. His ceasing to
discharge the duty of his office for the period of three
consecutive months, except when prevented by sickness, or
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concluded that unless Judge Ewing gave the governor "his
resignation . » , the office will not be vacant until three
consecutive months have elapsed in which he has refrained
from discharging the duty of his office, unless prevented
from discharging his duty by sickness.”^
The supreme court did not accept the attorney
general *s strict interpretation of the statutory provision
Instead, the court reasoned that: (1) since the judge had
properly notified the governor of his retirement, (2) since
he was entitled to receive a retirement allowance under the
retirement system, and (3) since he would not be paid for
any further services rendered to the state after his retire
ment, the judge had voluntarily exercised his right to
retire which thereby created a vacancy.

In other words,

the court chose not to distinguish between "resignation"
and "retirement" and ruled that the statutory provision-section $11--was not exclusive so that events other than
those enumerated in the section could also create a vacancy«
The court maintained that a vacancy arises whenever an
office is unoccupied by an incumbent who has a legal right
when absent from the state by permission of the legislative
assembly," conviction of a felony, refusal or neglect to
file his oath or bond, or a void election.
20 Mont. 510, The decision specifically states
that the quoted passage was part of the attorney générales
opinion; however, the opinion does not appear in 22 Op.
Atty. Gen. (1947-48).
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to continue In the office.
Having established that there was a vacancy created
by the judge^s retirement, the court held that the governor
had constitutional authority to fill the vacancy; it cited
Article Vlll, section 34, of the Montana constitution:
"Vacancies in the office of . . . judge of the district
court . . . shall be filled by appointment, by the governor
of the state. , .
Length of the Appointee^s Tei-m
General.-“The general rule in state government
where an individual has been appointed to a newly created
elective office is that the appointee’s term lasts only
until the next general election.^ ^

This rule became estab

lished in Montana when the Montana supreme court decided
in State ex rel. Patterson v. Lentz 11 that a district judge
appointed to a newly created judgeship could serve only
until the next general biennial election, and not until the
next quadrennial election at which the district judges
generally were to be elected.

The case involved an apparent

conflict between the clearly stated intent of a statute, and
a constitutional provision of general import.

The court

gave a literal construction to the constitutional provision
^^42 Am, Jur., Public Officers, sec. 142.
^^30 Mont. 322, 146 P. 932 (1915).
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to terminate the duration of the gubernatorial appointment
before the time specified by the legislature*
The Patterson Case.— In 1913» the legislature
created an additional judgeship in the fourth judicial dis
trict and authorized the governor to appoint a judge who
would serve until after the second subsequent general
biennial election in November 1916.^^

In accordance with

this legislation the governor appointed Patterson to this
judgeship and gave him a commission stating that he was to
hold the judgeship until the first Monday in January 1917.
The legislature^s intent appears to have been to have the
term of the new judgeship coincide with the quadrennial
term of other district judges elected in presidential elec
tion years;
This legislative intent appeared to conflict with
Article VIII, section 34, of the Montana constitution, which
provided that vacancies in district judgeships would be
filled by appointment "until the next general election and
until his successor is elected and qualified."^ ^
^^1913 Laws, c. 14, p. 14. Section 2 of the act
provided: "The governor shall appoint some fit and quali
fied person as additional judge of the said fourth judicial
district to hold his office until the first Monday of
January, 1917, or until his successor is duly elected and
qualifi ed."
1

•^Mont. Const., Art. VIII, sec. 34. Vacancies in
the office of . . . judge of the district court . , . shall
be filled by appointment, by the governor of the state. . .
A person appointed to fill any such vacancy shall hold
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Patterson argued that this constitutional provision
should be construed to read "until the next general
(judicial) election"; that is, that such elections were
quadrennial.

Thus Patterson claimed that his appointment

was valid until a successor was elected in the November
1916 election.
The court chose the view that "next general elec
tion" meant the next biennial election to be held in
November 1914.

The court's ruling placed heavy emphasis on

the last two sentences of Article VIII, section 34, and
concluded that Patterson's appointment was valid only un
til the next general election and, therefore, the governor
in his commission to Patterson could not extend the
appointee's term beyond the next general biennial election.
Summary
The Montana supreme court in both the Neill and
Jardine cases has ruled that a vacancy exists in an office
whenever the office is empty and without an incumbent who
has a right to the office.

In addition in both cases, the

court held that the vacancy in question should be filled by
the governor.
In the Neill decision, the court with statutory
office until the next general election and until his succes
sor is elected and qualified. A person elected to fill a
vacancy shall hold office until the expiration of the terra
for which the person he succeeds was elected.
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direction held that an appointee*s voluntary resignation
and its acceptance by the governor created a vacancy within
the office.

Section 1101 presented the court with clear

authority to hold that the acceptance of the resignation
by the governor left the office empty and without an incum
bent and thereby created a vacancy.
The Neill decision affirms the statutory appoint
ment power vested in the governor, and to the extent that
it has affirmed this statutory power, the decision has
strengthened the appointment power of the governor.
Since the statute presented clear direction for the
court to render this decision, the court was unable to
exercise a mode of interpretation in the absence of a prima
facie constitutional or statutory clarity.
In the Jardine decision, the court was given slight
assistance by section 511 which enumerated ten contingen
cies that would cause a vacancy.

Consequently, since the

court lacked any clear constitutional or statutory direction
regarding the issue of vacancy, it exercised a mode of
interpretation when it held that section 511 was not exclu
sive , and thereby provided that other contingencies such
as retirement could cause a vacancy.

The court’s exercise

of this mode of interpretation has strengthened the gover
nor’s appointment power and, consequently, becomes a case
in point to prove the hypothesis of this study.
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not to distinguish between "resignation" and "retirement
the court exercised a mode of interpretation creating a
vacancy, and thereby providing the governor with an oppor
tunity to exercise his appointment power*
The Patterson decision was also rendered with
little clear statutory or constitutional direction*

The

legislation on the one hand said the length of the
appointee*s term would last until January 1917, whereas the
constitution provided that the term should last only until
the next general election*

Consequently, the court looked

to past decisions for the policy that appointments to fill
vacancies in elective offices were to remain in effect only
until the people could act through an election*
This decision does not focus on the governor* s
appointment power per se; instead, it focuses on the term
of the gubernatorial appointee who is appointed to an elec
tive office*

The decision held that the length of a guber

natorial appointee’s term to an elective office is only
until the next biennial election*
Although the court did rely on precedent and did
partially exercise a mode of judicial interpretation in
reaching its decision, this is not a proper case to prove
or disprove the study’s hypothesis since the vacancy to be
filled was an elective office and not an appointive office*
With reference to elective offices, it seems proper that
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any appointment should only last until the people $ at the
earliest opportunity, can fill the vacancy by election in
accordance with the constitution, irrespective of what
specific legislation may provide.
The Power to Make Interim
Appointments
General
The focus of this study now shifts to those in
stances where the governor has the power to make an appoint
ment after the confirming body has adjourned.

These

appointments are often called ”recess" appointments, even
in the Montana constitution. Nonetheless, a more accurate
description would be "interim” appointments.

The source

of this power for the Montana governor is Article VII,
section 7, of the Montana constitution which provides:
The governor shall nominate, and by and
with the consent of the senate, appoint all
officers whose offices are established by this
constitution, or which may be created by law,
and whose appointment or election is not other
wise provided for. If during the recess of the
senate a vacancy occur in any such office, the
governor shall appoint some fit person to dis
charge the duties thereof until the next meeting
of the senate, when he shall nominate some per
son to fill such office
Generally, the appointing power may, after adjourn
ment by the confirming body, fill a vacancy which has
occurred since the adjournment.

However, the vacancy must

occur after the adjournment; a governor may not, after
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adjournment by the senate or confirming body, fill a vacancy
that existed while

that body was in session.

The three previous cases in this chapter were cases
where the governor has the power to appoint without the need
of a confirming body.

Two cases present issues concerning

the governor*s power to make appointments requiring confir
mation during the time the confirming body is not in session.
The issue of what constitutes a vacancy becomes even more
important since the governor cannot make an interim appoint
ment unless a vacancy exists*
The Nagle Case.— In State ex rel, Nagle v. Staf
ford,

the Montana supreme court held that no vacancy ex

isted in an office when aholdover appointee could still
perform the duties

of the office.

On April 5, 1919, the governor appointed Stafford
to be commissioner of agriculture for a term ending
April 1, 1933*

In 1931, the senate confirmed the

appointment in accordance with Article XVIII, section 1,
of the Montana constitution,^^ and statutory section
^^30 Am. Jur. 2d 937, Governor sec. 7 {I960).
1^97 Mont. 275, 34 P.2d 372 (1934).
^^Mont. Const., Art. XVIII, sec. 1. The legislative
assembly may provide for a bureau of agriculture, labor and
industry, to be located at the capital and be under the con
trol of a commissioner appointed by the governor subject to
the confirmation of the senate. The commissioner shall hold
his office for four years, and until his successor is ap
pointed and qualified; his compensation shall be as provided
by law.
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3556.^'^

On March 13, 1933, the governor reappointed Staf

ford to the office for another four-year ternio
day, the governor resigned.

On the same

Later, on November 27, 1933,

the acting governor called a special session of the legis
lature ; during that special session, Stafford* s appoint
ment was presented to the senate which failed to confirm
it. After the special session was over, the acting governor
attempted, on February 1, 1934, to appoint Bruce to be com
missioner of agriculture.

Thus the facts created this issue?

whether a vacancy existed in the office of commissioner of
agriculture so that the acting governor could appoint Bruce
to fill the vacancy until the legislature was back in
session.
By taking into consideration the special provision
of the constitution— Article XVIII, section 1--the supreme
court held that Stafford had the right to serve, as a hold
over appointee, under his original confirmed appointment
until his successor was appointed, confirmed and qualified.
In other words, the court ruled that there was no vacancy
in the office since there was still someone in the office
17Mont. Rev. Codes, sec. 3556 (1921). The chief
executive officer of the department of agriculture, labor,
and industry, hereinafter referred to as the commissioner
of agriculture, shall be a commissioner of agriculture, to
be appointed by the governor, by and with the consent of the
senate, and such commissioner shall hold office for a term
of four years or until his successor is appointed and
qualified.
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who could discharge the duties of the office.

Thus the

acting governor could not exercise his interim appointment
power.
The Olsen Case.--State ex rel. Olsen v. Swanberg

1Ô

again held that no vacancy existed in an appointive office
because the confirmed holdover appointee had better title
to the office then the non-confirmed replacement appointee.
On December 29, 1952, Swanberg was appointed by the
governor and later confirmed to be chairman of the indus
trial accident board to fill a term expiring on May 1, 1955On April 29, 1955, the governor appointed McChesney to re
place Swanberg as chairman for a four-year term expiring
May 1, 1959-

At the time of McChesney's appointment, the

legislature was not in session, hence McChesney's appoint
ment had not been referred to the senate for confirmation.
The governor's power to make the appointment was
derived from section 92-104.^^

This section clearly stated

that the governor's appointments to the board must be con
firmed "by and with the consent of the senate."

The issue

1^130 Mont. 202, 299 P.2d 466 (1956).
^^Mont, Rev. Codes, sec. 92-104 (1947), as amended
by 1953 Laws, c. l6l, pp. 213-314. There is hereby created
a board to consist of three (3) members. . . . and one mem
ber shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the con
sent of the senate. . . . The term of office of the appointed
member of the board shall be four (4) years and until his
successor shall have been appointed and confirmed.
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thus became whether the clear constitutional and statutory
directive for filling the office with a confirmed appointee
should prevail over the statement providing for a fouryear term,
McChesney argued that a vacancy existed in the
office upon the expiration of Swanberg*s term, and that
this vacancy occurred during a senate adjournment thereby
authorizing a gubernatorial appointment in accordance with
Article VII, section 7, of the Montana constitution.

How

ever, Justice Forrest Anderson speaking for the court ruled
that this provision in the constitution "has reference only
to such vacancies which leave the office without anyone to
discharge the duties and does not apply to a case where the
incumbent holds until his successor is elected or appointed
and qualified and is discharging the duties of his office,"

20

Justice Anderson’s opinion distinguished between a non
confirmed successor and a previously confirmed appointee and
held that until successors are confirmed by the senate, a
previously confirmed appointee is entitled to hold over in
the office.

Justice Anderson concluded therefore that Swan

berg upon serving his four-year term could continue to hold
the office as a previously confirmed appointee until his
successor had been appointed, qualified and confirmed.
2^130 Mont. 205
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Summary
Both the Nagle and Olsen decisions by the Montana
supreme court have affected the implementation of the
governor's constitutionally defined interim appointment
power.

The court in these two decisions has exercised a

restrictive mode of interpretation concerning the word
"vacancy" which, when a previously confirmed appointee
remains able to perform his duties, prohibits the governor
from making any interim appointments which would require
confirmation when the confirming body is not in session.
An obvious result of these decisions is that (1) if a newly
elected governor fails to make all his appointments re
quiring confirmation in the first two months of his admin
istration while the confirming body is in session, and
(2) if the statute provides for a definite term "and until
his successor is appointed and confirmed," the governor
will have to wait 22 months before confirmation can be ob
tained, during which time he must guide his administration
with some of the previous governor’s appointees.

This kind

of a result is categorically bad and undesirable.
Every governor should have "his team" during his
administration, and state supreme courts through their
decisions should attempt to achieve this result when they
are not bound by the constitution or statutes to do other
wise.

It can be argued that in the Olsen case, the Montana

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34
court was bound by legislation which provided that the con
firmed appointee should holdover "until his successor was
appointed and confirmed."

However, this does not excuse

the court from its holding in the Nagle case, since the
statute in that case simply required that the appointee be
"appointed and qualified."

The word "qualified" usually

has meant meeting basic bonding requirements, and nothing
more.

Thus it would appear that in the Nagle case the court

could have easily held that once the appointee satisfied
the bonding requirements he was qualified to assume the
interim appointment.
The effect of these two decisions is to allow a
holdover appointee to remain in office beyond his term un
til the non-confirmed appointee is confirmed, when the
spirit of Article VII, section 7, of the Montana constitu
tion seems to provide that the governor can make an interim
appointment until the confirming body comes back into
session.

In other words, the effect of these two decisions

has weakened the Montana governor*s interim appointment
power.

In the Nagle case, the inheritor of the primary

blame for this weakened power is the court since it placed
an improper emphasis and definition on the word "qualified,"
whereas, in the Olsen case, only the secondary blame falls
on the court for the weakened power since legislation
existed udiich had already weakened this appointment power.
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For the purposes of this study it can be concluded that in
the Nagle case, the court, in the presence of clear con
stitutional and statutory direction favoring an interim
appointment, weakened the governor’s power, whereas, in
the Olsen case, the court, in the presence of clear statu
tory direction opposing an interim appointment, also
weakened the governor’s power.
Abuse of the Appointment Power
The Cutts Case
The Montana supreme court was once presented with
the issue of whether the governor possessed the authority
to make an appointment to fill a legislative vacancy.
State ex rel. Cutts v. Hart

21

held that the governor did

not have the authority to fill by appointment the legis
lative vacancy created by death of a member of the Montana
house of representatives when the constitution expressly
contemplated a special election for that purpose.

On

February 7, 1917» in the midst of the 60-day legislative
session, the governor appointed Cutts to fill the unexpired
term of the deceased representative.
The court noted that since Article V, section 45,
21 56 Mont. 571, 1Ô5 P. 769 (1919).
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of the Montana constitution

pp

provided that the only way

in which to fill a vacancy caused by death was for the
governor to issue writs of election.

The people had "re

tained in themselves, and in themselves alone, the power
to fill vacancies in the legislative b o d i e s . T h u s ,
the court held that the governor's appointment of Cutts
was made contrary to the Constitution.
Summary
The Cutts decision was based on a clear consti
tutional provision which directed the governor to issue
writs of election--not to make an appointment.

The

governor abused his constitutional appointment power when
he appointed Cutts contrary to Article V, section 45.
Article V, section 45j may have been both imprac
ticable and unrealistic in that it would take too long to
implement.

If a vacancy occurred while the 60-day legis

lature was in session, as in the Cutts case, the process
of election could occupy most of the session by the time
the special election was held.

Valuable legislative time

would have passed leaving the people in the legislative
^^Mont. Const,, Art. V, sec. 45* When vacancies
occur in either house, the governor or the person exer
cising the functions of the governor shall issue writs
of election to fill the same.
2356 Mont, 574.
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district without complete representation.
In 1932, Article V, section 45, was amended in an
effort to correct this deficiency.

Legislative vacancies

by death were expressly excepted from this provision for
special election and the county commissioners were author
ized to appoint to fill legislative vacancies.

The entire

constitutional provision was repealed in 1966 as an inci
dent of legislative reapportionment, leaving in force an
early statute which had echoed the original constitutional
provision.

Once again the vacancies are to be filled by

special election.

This repeal failed to resolve the prob

lem which still exists: the valuable loss of legislative
time and the lack of representation of electors in the dis
trict during the implementation of the special election.
The Cutts case neither proves nor disproves the
hypothesis of this study.

The categorical constitutional

provision left the court no room to exercise an indepen
dent mode of interpretation.
The Removal Power
Removal from Office Where Term
Is Not Fixed
In State ex rel, Bonner v. District C o u r t , t h e
Montana court held that a gubernatorial appointee, who holds
a public office whose term or duration is not fixed by law,
^^122 Mont, 464, 206 P.2d 166 (1949).
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holds the office at the pleasure and will of the governoro
On May 6, 1937, Governor Ayers appointed Craighead
to be chairman of the unemployment compensation commission^
and for the next 12 years Craighead remained as chairman
of the commission.

Following the sine die adjournment of

the legislature, Governor Bonner on March 28, 1949» in
formed Craighead that his services would not be needed
after March 31 » upon which day he appointed Stewart to be
chairman.

On April 1, Craighead sought an injunction

against Stewart and Governor Bonner to restrain them from
interfering with his duties as chairman.

The sole question

before the court was who was entitled to hold and exercise
the chairmanship of the commission.
One Montana statute provided that the chairman of
the commission was to be paid a full-time salary, without
providing for a fixed terra of o f f i c e . I n addition,
another statute provided that "every office of which the
duration is not fixed by law is held at the pleasure of the
appointing power.
Chief Justice Adair, speaking for the majority,
25i 937 Laws, c. 137, sec. 10(a), p. 439»
. . . The
third member of the commission, who shall be designated as
chairman at the time of his appointment, shall be paid a
full-time salary in an amount to be fixed by the governor
and shall be the executive director,

26Mont. Rev. Codes, sec. 422 (1935)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39
noted the general rule concerning the holding of a public
office whose term is not fixed by law was that in the
absence of constitutional restrictions, "the power to
appoint an officer carries with it the power to remove at
the pleasure of the appointing power, where the appoint
ment is not for a fixed term."^^

After observing that the

unemployment compensation law failed to create a fixed
term for the chairman, and in view of section 422, the
chief justice held that, "As the duration of his office is
not fixed by law, ^raighea^7 held at the pleasure of that
pà
Governor,"
and therefore could be removed by the governor
at his will.
Justice Angstman dissented, arguing that section
10(a) of the law provided for the creation of the commis
sion and that it "shall consist of three members who shall
be appointed by the governor on a non-partisan merit
b a s i s , a n d therefore required that under the merit
system there could be no removal at the mere will of the
appointing power.
The phrase "non-partisan merit basis" has
acquired a distinct and well known meaning. Once
^*^See annotation in 119 ALR 1437, as quoted in
122 Mont. 471 .
2^122 Mont. 482.
29i937 Laws, c. 137, sec. 10(a), p. 439.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40
an appointment is made under it, removal can
be accomplished only for cause and not upon
personal considerations.^^
In addition he argued that section 422 could have
no application to one appointed under the merit system.
Thus he concluded that persons appointed under the merit
system could not be discharged except for cause.
As to appointments made by the governor on
a merit basis, he can adopt such reasonable
method as he sees fit in determining the fitness
of applicants. Once he makes an appointment.
removal can be accomplished only for cause,3i
Removal "for Cause**
The gubernatorial power to appoint to public office
carries with it the power to remove, in the absence of con
stitutional or statutory restraint.

In Montana, the courts

have held that a constitutional or statutory provision for
appointment for a fixed term constitutes such a restraint
and, in the absence of any provision for summary removal,
one who is appointed for a fixed term can be removed only
**for cause.”

This phrase "for cause” has generally meant

removal for reasons which law and sound public policy have
recognized as sufficient to justify removal.

The Montana

supreme court, on three different occasions, has been
called upon to decide what constitutes removal "for cause,"
3O122 Mont, 485, 486,
3^122 Mont, 490, 491.
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The Sullivan Case
State ex. rel. Nagle v. Sullivan^^ held that the
phrase ^^for cause” means that the governor must give notice
to the appointed officer and provide him with a hearing or
opportunity to be heard in his defense.
Governor Erickson appointed Sullivan, Flynn and
Steinbrenner to the state fish and game commission for fixed
terms, and then himself resigned.

A year later, the acting

governor revoked their appointments "for the good of the
commission," and in their place appointed Baumgartner,
Gutensohn and Harper.

A statute fixed the term of service

on the commission at "four years, unless sooner removed"
and further provided that the governor had the power to
fill all vacancies and "to remove any member of said commission for cause or for the good of the commission," 33
Sullivan claimed that the attempted removal was void on the
ground that "the action was taken without notice, hearing
3290 Mont. 425, 40 P.2d 995 (1935).
^^Mont. Rev. Codes, sec. 3561 (1921), The members
of the commission hereby created shall be appointed by the
governor of the state of Montana. . . . Two of said members
shall be appointed to serve for one year, one to serve two
years, one to serve three years, and one to serve four
years, and thereafter to be appointed by the governor at
the expiration of their first terms, to serve for four years
unless sooner removed. All vacancies in the commission
shall be filled by the governor. The governor is hereby
given the power to remove any member of said commission
for cause or for the good of the commission.
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or opportunity to be h e a r d " w h i l e Baumgartner alleged
that certain matters existed giving legal cause for removal,
and further claimed that requirements of notice and a hear
ing were not necessary.

The sole issue before the court

was whether the governor had the authority to remove Sulli
van without notice, hearing or opportunity to be heard.
The majority of the court held that:
When a statute provides for an appointment for a
definite term of office, without provision other
wise, or provides for removal "for cause," with
out qualification, removal may be effected only
after notice has been given to the officer of the
charges made against him and he has been given an
opportunity to be heard in his defense.35
Thus, the court ordered that the governor could remove
Sullivan only after he had received notice and had been
given an opportunity to be heard in his defense.

It may be

noted that the majority based its decision on the statutory
phrase of removal "for cause," while the governor had ex
pressly rested his removal order on the statutory ground
that it was "for the good of the commission."
Justice Stewart in a concurring opinion agreed with
the majority that any removal "for cause" required notice
and a hearing for the appointee.

However, he stated that

the issues had become
confused to such an extent that the reasons for
the action of the Governor /had7 been entirely
349g Mont. 436.
^^98 Mont. 439.
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shifted from the broad ground of "for the good
of the commission" to the specific charges of
wrongdoing, or malfeasance and misfeasance in
office.36
Justice Stewart argued that had the case proceeded solely
upon the general grounds originally stated by the governor
without the injection of the specific grounds the governor
would have had the authority "to remove a commissioner
without notice or hearing when it is done for the good of
the commission— for the better administration of the affairs
of the department
The dissent by Justice Angstman urged that where
"the statute simply states that an officer may be removed
’for cause’ without any qualifying words and without speci
fying what constitutes ’cause,’ the removing power has
authority to determine what shall constitute cause, as well
as to determine whether that cause e x i s t s . J u s t i c e
Angstman argued that the legislative intent should govern
whether notice and a hearing were requisite before the
governor could remove a commissioner.

To determine this

intent he reviewed similar legislative enactments of the
1921 Montana legislative assembly.

His review illustrated

that in "some cases notice and hearing are essential, In
369g Mont. 446.
37qg Mont. 446,
3Ô9Ô Mont. 447.
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others not; and this is true whether the tenure is for a
fixed term or o t h e r w i s e F r o m this analysis he argued
that "there was no thought on the part of that assembly
that an officer could not be removed for cause without
first giving notice and holding a hearing, except in those
cases where notice and hearing were specifically provided
f o r T h e

justice concluded that the removal power of

the governor was discretionary, and could be exercised
without notice or hearing.

For additional support he

cited an Oklahoma case which held:
An appointee to such a position is selected by
the chief executive for the purpose of aiding
the executive in carrying out his sense of
duties and responsibilities to the public and
with the belief that such appointee will work
in harmony with and aid the Governor in ful
filling his sense of duty to the public. It is
the Governor, the chief executive, who is held
responsible to the sovereignty for errohs in
his executive and administrative policies. The
appointee is responsible to the chief executive,
and in the absence of express authority, the
judiciary has nothing to do with the chief
executive's judgment, conscience, sense of
duty, or responsibilities.41
The Holt Case
The second Montana supreme court decision concerning
the authority of the governor to remove appointees "for
3998 Mont, 450.
Mont. 450.
41Bynum v. Strain, 95 Okla. 45, 218 P. 883 (1923),
as quoted in 98 Mont. 451.
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cause” was State ex rel. Holt v. District Court^^ which held
that the phrase ”for cause" meant not only that the governor
must provide notice and a hearing, but also must hear all
evidence offered in defense by the appointee relating to
his good faith.
Acting Governor Holt, on October 26, 1936, charged
that the three members of the state highway commission had
illegally drawn state funds and issued a notice to the com
missioners to appear before him to show cause, if they had
any, why they should not be removed.

The commissioners

appeared and admitted receipt of the funds, but asserted
that they were received legally and that they had acted in
good faith.

They said that when they were informed that

the receipt of the funds was illegal, they refrained from
drawing further funds.

They also alleged that, by reason

of certain political activities, the governor "was biased
and prejudiced against them and therefore not a proper
person to try them on these accusations,"^^
The governor showed that the funds received by the
commissioners Were for per diem and mileage claimed by the
commissioners at times when the commission was not in
session.

When the commissioners admitted to this evidence.
42 i o 3 Mont. 43^, 63 P,2d 1026 (1936),
^3103 Mont. 441.
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the governor concluded that there was no necessity to hear
further evidence, and issued orders removing the commis
sioners from the commission.
Montana law created the highway commission and pro
vided that its three members should "be appointed by the
governor," to "hold office for the term of four years and
until his successor is appointed and q u a l i f i e d . A n o t h e r
statute further provided that "the members of the state
highway commission shall be appointed by the governor and
may be removed by him at any time for

cause.

"^5

The majority opinion referred to the Sullivan case
which had held that removal "for cause," without qualifi
cation, means that removal "may be effected only after
notice has been given to the officer of the charges made
against him and he has been given an opportunity to be
^^Mont. Rev, Codes, sec, 1763 (1935). There is
hereby created a commission to be known as the state high
way commission to consist of three members to be appointed
by the governor, , . ,
Each commissioner shall hold office for the term
of four years and until his successor is appointed and
qualified and shall receive as compensation . . , the sum
of ten dollars ($10,00) per diem for each day actually en
gaged in the duties of his office, including his time of
travel between his home and his place of employment of such
duties, together with his traveling expenses while away
from his home in the performance of the duties of his
office. , , .
45Mont, Rev. Codes, sec. 1764 (1935). The members
of the state highway commission shall be appointed by the
governor and may be removed by him at any time for
cause, . , ,
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heard in his d e f e n s e . T h e majority perceived the pri
mary issue to be whether the hearing before the governor
was "such a hearing as was contemplated under the rules
set forth in the Sullivan

c a s e ,

"47 which had held that

removal "for cause" had to be in accordance with the pub
lic policy of the state which required notice and a hear
ing.

In accordance with these rules, the majority stated

that "it was the duty of the governor to hear the evidence
which might be offered in support of the defense of good
faith.
With reference to the commissioners* other defense,
that of the governor*s prejudice, the majority held that
there was no provision for the disqualification of the
governor and, therefore, in accordance with the law, the
governor had the exclusive jurisdiction over the commis
sioners* removal.
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Morris,
began by stating:
The Governor, as the executive head of the
state government, is vested with broad discretion
ary powers and the majority opinion creates a
dangerous precedent by unreasonably restricting
such discretionary powers in the removal by the
46state ex rel. Nagle v. Sullivan, 9Ô Mont, 425»
439, as quoted in 103 Mont. 444•
^7 i o 3 Mont. 444.
4^103 Mont. 446.
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executive of members of his official family, his
appointees. . , . Upon the governor practically
alone rests the responsibility of the credi
bility of his administration, and to deny him
the practical control of his appointees, par
ticularly in the expenditure of public funds,
goes a long way towards the destruction of the
right to hold the t^hief Executive responsible
for the efficient administration of a government
of which he is the head and which was one of the
chief purposes of having a single individual the
executive head of the government.^9
Justice Morris, in further support of his opinion, then
cited a short part of U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice
Taft^ s majority opinion of the Myers case which broadly
defined the president *s removal power over inferior execu
tive appointees.
The vesting of the executive power in the
President was essentially a grant of the power to
execute the laws. But the President alone and
unaided could not execute the laws. He must exe
cute them by the assistance of subordinates. . . ,
As he is charged specifically to take care that
they be faithfully executed, the reasonable impli
cation, even in the absence of express words, was
that as part of his executive power he should select
those who were to act for him, . , , The further
implication must be, in the absence of any express
limitation respecting removals, that as his selec
tion of administrative officers is essential to the
execution of the laws by him, so must be his power
of removing those for whom he cannot continue to be
responsible.50
Justice Morris argued that the same reasoning applies to the
chief executive of a state as to the chief executive of a
49103 Mont. 449, 450.
^^yers v. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. 21, 25,
71 L.Ed. 160, 166 (1926), as quoted in IO3 Mont. 450.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

49
nation.

In addition, he questioned the purpose of the

governor* s having to hear the defenses of good faith since
the governor, after the defenses, still possessed sole
discretionary power to remove the commissioners.
The Matson Case
State ex rel. Matson v. 0*Hern^^ held that, once
the governor provided the appointees with notice and an
opportunity to be heard to present their defense, the
governor had the power to remove executive appointees "for
cause,”

This case was a continuation of the Holt case in

which the court had held that removal "for cause" meant that
the governor must provide notice and a hearing so that the
appointee can present his defense.

The Matson case went

one step further, with the same facts, and held that after
the governor had given notice and an opportunity for the
appointee to present his defense he had discretionary power
to remove the executive appointee.
After the Holt decision, the acting governor did
provide the commissioners with notice and an opportunity to
present their defenses.

Upon completion of this hearing,

the governor removed the commissioners in accordance with
section 1704.^^
5"*104 Mont. 126, 65 P.2d 619 (1937)52Mont. Rev, Codes, sec. 1784 (1935)»
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The majority opinion, written by Justice Stewart
who had concurred in the Sullivan case, noted that the
Montana constitution provides that "all officers not liable
to impeachment shall be subject to removal for misconduct
or malfeasance in office, in such manner as may be provided
by law."^^

He noted the statutory provision upon which the

governor acted which stated:

"The members of the state

highway commission shall be appointed by the governor and
may be removed by him at any time for c a u s e . I n

dis

charging his executive duties, the court maintained that
the governor acted not only under the authority of the
statute which gave him power to remove the appointees, but
also under the state constitution.

Viewing the Montana law,

the majority concluded that the governor had the power to
remove the commissioners, and held that "the powers here
reposed in him and exercised by him in this proceeding are
of a discretionary character, and that his action could be
subject to our review only if it should clearly appear from
the record that he acted with no facts to move his dis
cretion."^5

Thus, the court held that the grant of the

53Mont. Const., Art. VII, sec. 7»
3^Mont. Rev. Codes, sec. 17Ô4 (1935)«
55104 Mont. 150.
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removal power to the executive to remove "for cause" im
plies that the executive has the authority to judge what
constitutes cause for removal, but qualified this by hold
ing that there must be sufficient facts to move his dis
cretion.
The dissenting opinion was written by Justice
Angstman who had also written the dissenting opinion in
the Sullivan case.

It will be remembered that in the Sul

livan dissent Justice Angstman had written that the
governor's removal power was discretionary and, therefore,
the power of removal could be exercised by the governor
without providing notice and a hearing to the appointee.
However, in the Matson case. Justice Angstman's dissenting
opinion was based on the majority opinion of the Sullivan
case, which had held that the governor must provide notice
and a hearing where the removal is "for cause," and con
cluded that in the Matson case there was no evidence to
support the order of removal.

In other words. Justice

Angstman argued that the Sullivan case required a showing
of cause before the governor could remove an appointee,
and that in this case there was no showing of cause, since
there was no showing of bad faith by the appointee.

In

effect, Justice Angstman accepted the majority opinion in
the Sullivan case and then rigidly applied it to dissent
in this case maintaining that, since there was no showing
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of bad faith so as to constitute cause for removal, the
commissioners could not be removed.
Summary
In 1949, in the Craighead c a s e t h e Montana
supreme court held that a gubernatorial appointee, who
holds a public office whose term or duration is not fixed
by law, holds the office at the pleasure and will of the
governor.

This decision is consistent with the study*s

hypothesis since (1) it was rendered in the absence of
clear constitutional or statutory direction and since
(2) it strengthens the Montana governorship by allowing the
governor to remove such appointees at his will.

Unfor

tunately, the three earlier removal decisions failed to
accomplish this desirable result.
The first of the three earlier unfortunate deci
sions rendered by the Montana supreme court was the 1935
Sullivan decision in which the court exercised a mode of
interpretation which held that the governor could not re
move executive appointees "for cause" unless and until he
had provided the appointee with notice and an opportunity
to be heard.

This case, a bad precedent, served as a

foundation for two more cases which further weakened the
removal power of the executive.

From the beginning of this

^^State ex rel. Bonner v. District Court, 122 Mont
464 (1949).
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series of three unfortunate cases, it appears that the
court perceived the executive appointees to have an un
defined property right in the appointed office and that
the appointee could not be removed until after the governor
had acted according to judicial due process.

The better

mode on interpretation, in the absence of clear consti
tutional or statutory direction, would have held that an
appointee has no right in an appointed executive office,
except at the pleasure of the governor.
The Sullivan case held that the governor must give
notice and a hearing.

From this decision, the court held

in the 1936 Holt case that not only must the governor give
notice and an opportunity to be heard, but also that he
must allow the appointee to present all his evidence proving
good faith.

Up until the Holt case, the court had weakened

the governor* s removal power by imposing two procedural
requirements: notice and a hearing; in the Holt case the
majority went one step further to weaken his powers by im
posing an additional procedural and substantive require
ment— requiring the governor to hear all evidence offered
in defense by the appointee regarding his good faith.
From these two precedents, the majority in the 1937
Matson case held that the governor could in fact remove
the executive appointees, if he had adhered to the require
ments laid dovm in the Holt case.

The total effect of
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these decisions is to prohibit the governor from removing
executive appointees until after he has;

(1) given notice

to the appointee, (2) provided the appointee with an oppor
tunity to be heard, and (3) heard the good faith defenses
of the appointee.
Such needless restrictions on the governor’s dis
cretionary removal power:

(1) limit the removal power of

the governor, (2) weaken the executive function of the
governor, and (3) increase the difficulty of achieving a
responsible and efficient state executive.

The best

interests of a strong and responsible

state executive could

have been advanced in Montana had the

court followedthe

dissenting opinion in the Holt case.
It is ironic that the majority opinion in the
Matson case stated
. . . the members of the judiciary can only be
drawn from a class or profession
whose duty and
pride it is to study and understand governmental
principles and their practical application. . . .
All of this presupposes more than ordinary under
standing of governmental p r i n c i p l e s .57
The irony lies in the fact that the court’s opinion is
contrary to one of the fundamental concepts of state
government— the concept of a strong executive.

The court

maintains that it is their duty to understand the prin
ciples of government ; however, by their decision they turn
57-104 Mont, 152.
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their backs on one of the most important principles in
state government.
For this study^s hypothesis, all three of these
decisions, through the court^s mode of interpretation in
the absence of clear constitutional or statutory direction,
have weakened the governor*s removal power.
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CHAPTER IV
THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS
Jacksonian democracy left the American people with
an inheritance of little trust in the executive branch and
a rising loss of popular confidence in the legislative
branch.

"In the middle of the nineteenth century a weakened

and discredited legislature balanced a weakened execu1
tive."
Gradually, however, the governor's legislative
influence became stronger as confidence in the legisla
tive branch continued to decline.
Today, paradoxically, one of the Montana governor's
most important executive powers is legislative.

The posi

tive side of this power is the governor's legislation
2

approval power; the negative side is the governor’s veto
3
power.
The Montana governor has other positive executive
powers within the legislative branch, such as the power to
call extraordinary sessions of the legislative assembly,^
^Leslie Lipson, The American Governor from F igurehead to Leader (Chicagot University of Chicago Press,

T93^TTTrTJS7
^Mont.

Const., Art.V, sec. 40.

3Mont. Const., Art, Vll, secs. 12,

13.

^Mont. Const.,Art.Vll, sec. 11.
56
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and the power of policy formation when he appears before
the assembly to give his "State of the State" address.^
The Approval Power
Introduction
Article VII, section 12, of the Montana consti
tution carefully defines the role of the governor in the
final approval of legislation,^

There appear to be only

two exceptions to this role of gubernatorial participations
first, the actions of a single house are regarded as merely
internal to that chamber and do not require the governor’s
approval, and second, the actions of both houses "relating
solely to the transaction of the business of the two
h o u s e s " a l s o are exempt from the governor’s approval.
% o n t , Const,, A r t . VII, sec. 10, See Coleman B,
Ransone, Jr., The Office of Governor in the United States
(University, Alabama:
University of Alabama Press, 1956),
chap, 7.
^Mont. Const,, Art, VII, sec. 12, Every bill passed
by the legislative assembly shall, before it becomes a law,
be presented to the governor.
If he approves, he shall
sign it, and thereupon it shall become a law, . . , If any
bill shall not be returned by the governor within five days
(Sunday excepted) after it shall have been presented to
him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had
signed it, , , . N o bill shall become a law after final
adjournment of the legislative assembly, unless approved
by the governor within fifteen days after such adjourn
ment . , , o
"^Mont. Const,, A r t . V, sec, 40.
This constitutional
provision also stipulates that concurrent (joint) resolu
tions must be signed by the governor, whereas, the federal
constitution does not impose such a requirement of partici
pation on the president.
The Montana supreme court has also
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Governor^ s Approval of Legislative
Enactments
General
Since 1907, the Montana supreme court has had four
different occasions to discuss the governor's power to
approve legislation.

In all four cases, the court did in

cidentally note that the approval power was a constitu
tionally created power which gave the governor a funda
mental and component role in the legislative process.
The Evers Case
The first Montana supreme court decision to dis
cuss the governor’s legislation approval power was Evers v.
Hudson,

which stated that when the governor fails to re

turn within five days any bill passed by the legislature
and presented to him during the session, the bill becomes
law as if the governor had signed it.
During the 1907 legislative assembly, a statute was
enacted to establish county free high schools.

The bill

was presented to the governor for his approval, but before
sine die adjournment, the governor failed to approve

the

held that the governor must approve constitutional amend
ments, whereas, at the national level, the President does
not formally participate in the amendment process. See
the Livingstone case in this chapter.
^36 Mont. 135, 92 P. 462 (1907).
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bill.

It was urged that the bill failed to become law

because it lacked the governor's approval as required by
section 23 of the act which provided that this "Act shall
take effect and be in full force from and after its passage
and approval by the governor.
The court ruled that although the act had never
been expressly approved by the governor it nevertheless
became law in accordance with the Montana constitution
which provided that
If any bill shall not be returned by the governor
within five days (Sunday excepted) after it shall
have been presented to him, the same shall be a
law, in like manner as if he had signed it. . . .'^
The court held that the act became law as if it had been
signed and approved by the governor, irrespective of what
section 23 of the act had provided.

However, since the

approval issue was not the controlling issue in the case,
it must be remembered that the court's statements are only
dictum.
The Hay Case
State ex rel. Hay v, Hindson^^ stated that legis
lative enactments passed on the last day of the session and
^1907 Laws, c. 29, sec. 23.
^Awont. Const,, Art, Vll, sec. 12.
Mont. 353, 106 P. 362 (1910).
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not acted upon by the governor until after adjournment mus^.
be signed by the governor before they become operative as
lawo

The question presented by the case did not focus
on the governor’s approval power; instead, it focused on
possibly contradictory provisions in two different pieces
of legislation =

The governor’s legislation approval power

was mentioned in passing since both measures had been passed
on the last day of the legislative session and had not
been acted upon by the governor until after final adjourn
ment o
The court noted that Article VII, section 12, of
the Montana constitution required that the governor must
approve legislation which was enacted the last day of the
session and not signed by the governor until after the
adjournment.

In addition, the court noted that both pieces

of legislation were signed by the governor after adjourn
ment within the time required so as to make them both
operative as law.
The Toomey Case
State ex rel. Toomey v. State Board of Examiners

12

stated that the time of the governor’s approval by signa
ture fixed the time the enactment became law.
1274 Mont.

1, 23 S P. 316 (1 9 2 5 )
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The main issue focused on the clarity of an
appropriation statute which had been signed by the governor
four days before another general appropriation bill had
been approved.
The court stipulated that "no matter what the order
of the passage of these two appropriation bills in the
two houses of the legislature, neither had any force or
effect until approved by the governor, which act . , , fixed
the time when each became a law."^^
The Vaughn Case
Vaughn & Ragsdale Co. v. State Board of Equali
zation^^ held that when a bill with a defective enacting
clause is signed by the presiding officer of each house
and the governor, the bill does not become law because the
defective enacting clause is a fatal defect.
The facts were that a piece of legislation had the
proper enacting clause incorporated into the bill at the
committee stage after the bill had been introduced with a
defective enacting clause.

With the proper enacting clause,

the bill passed in both houses.

Somehow the original

defective enacting clause was reinstated before it was
signed by the governor, so that the governor signed a bill
^^74 Mont. 15.
^ 1 0 9 Mont, 52, 96 P.2d 420 (1939).
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which was then not the same bill as passed in both houses»
The majority noted that the bill which had passed
both houses was not the identical bill which had been
signed by the governor, and therefore ruled that the bill
was not law since the bill with the proper enacting clause
had not passed all the stages of the legislative process»
Summary
None of the four Montana cases noted has had as
its principal issue the governor’s legislation approval
power, but all of them incidentally discussed aspects of
this executive power»

These cases have recognized that the

governor plays a fundamental and component part in the
legislative process»
The approval power does provide the governor with
an opportunity to play a role in the legislative policy
formation process»

In state government, and particularly

in Montana where the legislature is in session only for
two months out of every two years, the governor should have
some role in the legislative process since it will be his
office and the executive branch which must implement and
execute the laws passed by the legislative assembly»
These four cases have little relevance for the
study’s hypothesis since the first three cases possessed
clear constitutional direction for the court in rendering
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its decision; thus, the court did not have to exercise any
mode of interpretation.

In the fourth case, the court did

not have clear constitutional or statutory direction in
reaching its decision.

Thus, it did exercise a mode of

interpretation, but the subject was the validity of a
defective enacting clause and not the governor’s approval
power.
Governor’s Approval of Constitutional
Amendments
General
It has been noted that the Montana governor plays
a role in the amending process of the state constitution.
This role of participation by the state executive in the
amending process is unique.

At the national level, the

president does not formally participate in the amendment
process; and in Montana, there is an excellent argument
that the Montana governor also should not participate in
the amending process.

However, the Montana supreme court

has chosen to involve the governor.
The Livingstone Case
Remarkably, after seven decades of state legis15
lation, State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray
held that
when the legislature neglects to present a proposed
1^137 Mont. 557, 354 P.2d 552 (1960)
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constitutional amendment to the governor for his approval
or rejection, the legislature creates a fatal defect in the
amendment process.
In 1959 * the legislative assembly passed a proposed
amendment to the Montana constitution by the required twothirds vote in each house.

The amendment was not referred

to the governor as had been common practice, but was sent
directly to Secretary of State Frank Murray for publication,
While the legislature was still in session, the attorney
general rendered an opinion stating that the approval by
the governor was not necessary on proposed constitutional
amendments «^^

Before publication of the proposal by the

secretary of state, Livingstone sought an injunction to
restrain the secretary of state from publishing the pro
posed amendment.
Justice Bottomly, delivering the opinion of the
court, ruled that the proposed constitutional amendment
contained a fatal defect when the legislature neglected to
present the proposed amendment to the governor for his
approval or disapproval.

He maintained that Article V,

section 40, of the Montana constitution required the
governor’s approval since it did not exempt proposed
amendments from the governor’s signature although it had
^^20 Op, Atty, Gen,

B

(1959-1960)
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listed certain other exemptions^

17

Justice Bottomly, more

centrally to the problem, argued that the amending article.,

1g
Article XIX, section 9, of the Montana constitution,
should not control the legislative article, Article V ,
section 40,

Therefore, "any vote of the Legislature re 

quiring concurrence of both houses must be presented to
the governor for his approval or disapproval and unless this
step is taken the vote is of no force or effect for any
purpose unless the vote is presented to the governor for his
approval or disapproval,"^^

In concluding his argument,

with reference to the legislative article, he stated'
1% o n t . Const,, A r t . V, sec, 40, Every order,
resolution or vote, in which the concurrence of both houses
may be necessary, except on the question of adjournment,
or relating solely to the transaction of the business of
the two houses, shall be presented to the governor,, and
before it shall take effect be approved by him, or, being
disapproved, be repassed by two-thirds of both houses, as
prescribed in the case of a bill,
^^Mont, Const,, Art, X j X , sec, 9= Amendments to
this constitution may be proposed in either house of the
legislative assembly, and if the same shall be voted for
by two-thirds of the members elected to each house, such
proposed amendments, together with the ayes and nays of
each house thereon, shall be entered in full on their
respective journals; and the secretary of state shall
cause the said amendment or amendments to be published , „ .
and , p p submitted to the qualified electors of the state
for their approval or rejection and such as are approved
by a majority of those voting thereon shall become part
of the constitution,
^^137 Mont,

567.
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It should be remembered that our Montana
Constitution is unique among state constitutions =
We find no other state constitution which con
tains the same provisions as ours. For these
reasons, the decisions from other jurisdictions
construing their state constitutions or the
federal constitution have little value or weight
here, as they construe constitutional provisions
altogether unlike our own. They are not in
point here,20
Justice Angstman concurred specially in the result
that the injunction should be issued against the secretary
of state.

However, he did not believe that it was neces

sary for a proposed constitutional amendment to be sub
mitted to the governor for his approval.

His argument was

twofold: first, he maintained that the spirit of Article V,
section 1, of the Montana constitution eliminated the need
for the governor’s approval of proposed constitutional
amendments since the article states that "the veto power
of the governor shall not extend to measures referred to
the people by the legislative a s s e m b l y . S e c o n d ,

he be

lieved that the amending article, Article XlX, section 9,
was a special provision which was not to be "controlled
by general provisions in the Constitution and particularly
not by section 40 of Article V."

22

It was Justice Angstman’s

2O137 Mont. 567.
^'‘137 Mont. 569.
2^137 Mont. 569.
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belief that a proposed constitutional amendment, after passage
in both houses, could go directly to the people for their
approval.

In other words, he believed the governor was

exempt from participating in the amendment process.
Summary
In the Livingstone case, the Montana supreme court
held that the governor plays a formal and vital role in the
amending process of the Montana constitution.

The opinion

is strange in that it is unique, both at the state and
national level.

Although the decision does strengthen the

office of the Montana governor in that the executive be
comes another check on the legislature when it passes pro
posed constitutional amendments, nevertheless, it also in
volves the governor in an area which history and logic dic
tate should be left to the legislative assembly and the
people.

In addition, the notion of an executive check on

constitutional amendment proposals rests in a misunder
standing of constitutional theory.
First of all, constitutional amendments should not
be confused with, and be treated like, ordinary legislation.
The authority to propose amendments to the constitution is
a separate article of the constitution.

Thus, the power

to amend is not necessarily a part of the power to legis
late.

Secondly, there is already one check on the
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legislative branch since all proposed amendments must be
approved by the people after being passed by the legisla
tive assembly.

Thirdly, where does it specifically state

in the Montana constitution that the governor is supposed
to approve proposed constitutional amendments?

Nowhere is

it specifically stated that the governor must approve the
proposed constitutional amendments before they are sub
mitted to the people for their approval.

Rather, the

amending article, Article XIX, section 9> impliedly ex
cludes the governor from participating in the amending pro
cess.
In addition, it seems strange that the court placed
so little emphasis on Article V, section I, which specifi
cally states that the governor does not possess the approval
or veto power over those "measures referred to the people
by the legislative assembly."

23

Certainly a constitutional

amendment comes within the spirit of this section since it
is referred to the people by the legislature.

Also, why

should the court choose section 40, an original provision
of the constitution, over section 1, as amended, a later
expression of the popular will?

The court chose a de

tailed specification of the legislative process to prevail
over the separate and special constitutional provision
23Mont. Const., A r t . V, sec. 1
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regarding the procedure for amendment of the constitution.
With reference to the hypothesis of this study,
this case is significant.

The court lacked any clear

prima facie constitutional or statutory direction.

The

court’s mode of interpretation strengthened the governor’s
approval power, but only by moving into an area— constitu
tional amendments--previously and generally regarded as
outside the governor’s range of powers.

Thus, for the

purpose of this study, it may be concluded that the
Livingstone case furnishes an instance in which the Montana
supreme court, through its mode of interpretation, has
strengthened the governor’s approval power; however, in all
fairness to the study, it must be noted that the decision
strengthens the governor’s approval power by going outside
the previously defined limits of this power.
The Veto Power
Introduction
The Montana governor’s veto power is lodged in, and
defined by, Article VII, sections 12 and 13, of the Montana
constitution.

This veto power can be qualified or absolute

depending on particular circumstances at the time.

The

governor’s veto is qualified when it can be overridden by
a two-thirds vote in both houses; it is absolute after the
assembly has adjourned since all bills presented to the
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governor after adjournment must be signed by him within 15
days.

The veto power, be it qualified or absolute, con

tributes materially to the powers of the Montana governor.
The governor implements his qualified veto by
returning a bill unsigned to the house in which the bill
originated along with a statement of his objections.

The

executive’s veto prevails and defeats the bill unless the
assembly, with a quorum present, overrides the governor’s
action by a two-thirds vote in each house.

The governor

implements his absolute veto when he fails to approve a
bill within 15 days after adjournment.

This method is

often called a "pocket veto.”
The Item Veto
General
The item veto power of the Montana governor is
located in Article VII, section 13> of the Montana consti
tution, and provides that the governor, unlike the presi
dent, can veto items in an appropriations bill and still
approve the remainder.

Consequently, the governor is never

saddled with the burden of having to choose between
approving or vetoing an appropriation measure which has a
repugnant "rider" attached to it, as the president is often
obligated to do.

This item veto effectively prevents the

legislature from attaching riders to legislation since the
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governor, through the use of the item veto, can single out
the riders and reject them while approving the remainder
of the bill.

The item veto has only once been the subject

of a Montana supreme court decision.
The Veto Case
The well-known Veto case^^ held that the governor's
constitutional item veto power does not include the power
to scale items in appropriation measures.
Governor Dixon reduced eight items in an appropri
ation bill which had provided money for the operation and
maintenance of various state boards, commissions and
departments.

After reducing these items, the governor

approved the whole bill since he could not return the bill
to the legislature which had adjourned.
Chief Justice Callaway noted that "While the supreme
executive power of this state is vested in the governor
{Const., Art. VII, sec. 5), he is forbidden to exercise any
legislative function except that granted to him expressly
25
by the terms of the Constitution,"
The court recognized
that the constitution expressly granted an item veto power
to the governor to disapprove items in appropriation bills.
But Article Vll, section 13» of the constitution
24Mills

V .

Porter, 69 Mont. 325, 222 P. 428 (1924)

2^69 Mont. 330
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presented a problem for the court because the section used
both the words ”part” and "item" in a troublesome fashion.
Chief Justice Callaway believed the words were to be used
interchangeably and were meant to be used as synonyms; any
other meaning or interpretation of the words other than as
synonyms would violate both the spirit and letter of the
constitution.
The court concluded that the governor did not have
the power to veto a part of an item in any appropriation
bill.

It relied heavily on an Illinois case which stated:
The legislative branch of the government is vested
with the discretion to determine the amount which
should be appropriated for any particular object.
The Governor, as the chief executive of the State,
is given the right to approve or disapprove of any
action of the legislature in making such an approp
riation. He may disapprove of it . . . for any
other reason satisfactory to him, but he has not
the right to disapprove of a certain portion of an
item appropriated and approve of the remainder,
and thus perform a function which belongs exclu
sively to the legislative branch,--that of using
the discretion necessary to determine the amount
which should be appropriated for any particular
object.27

Mont. Const., Art. VII, sec. 13* The governor
shall have power to disapprove of any item or items of any
bill making appropriations of money, embracing distinct
items, and the part or parts approved shall become a law,
and the item or items disapproved shall be void. . . .
27Fergus v. Russel, 270 111. 304, 348, 349 (1915),
as quoted in Mills v. Porter, 69 Mont. 325, 333, 334.
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Summary
The courtes decision seems consistent with the
functional system of needed checks and balances in state
government.

Had the court upheld the governor's attempted

scaling, it would have allowed the governor to determine
the amount to be appropriated in any given bill; it would,
in effect, have granted part of the legislation function
of appropriating money to the executive.
Concerning this study's hypothesis, the Veto case
decision is relevant since the court exercised a mode of
interpretation in the absence of any clear constitutional
provision or statute.

This mode of interpretation brought

the court to hold that the governor, as a proper exercise
of his item veto power, could not scale specific items in
an appropriations bill.

This mode of interpretation, to

the extent that it affirms the governor's item veto power,
strengthens the powers of the governor, while at the same
time, it provides that the legislative function must be
exercised by the legislature unless a specific grant of
the legislative function has been made to one of the other
co-equal branches of state government.

Thus, for the sake

of this study, it can be concluded that the mode of inter
pretation exercised by the Montana supreme court in the
Veto case is consistent with the concept of a strong
governor, to the extent that it affirms the governor's item
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veto powero
Proclamation Power to Convene Extra
ordinary Legislative Sessions
Although the Montana constitution makes the exer
cise of legislative powers independent from the exercise
of executive powers,

2à

the Montana governor, nevertheless,

possesses certain constitutional checks which basically
are legislative powers„

One of these checks is that the

governor may convene extraordinary sessions of the legis
lative assembly by issuing a proclamation stating the purpose for the session^

2Q

When such a special session Is

called, the assembly is limited to legislation only within
those subject areas specified by his call; that is, speci
fied by the proclamation or by a subsequent message to tne
assemblyo
The Montana supreme court on five different
occasions has considered whether specific legislation was
within the governor-s call for an extraordinary session.
On two occasions the issue focused on whether the legis
lation passed during the extra session was within the pur
view of the governor's proclamation; on the three other
occasions, the issue focused on whether the legislation was

^^Monto Consto, A r t . IV, sec,
^^Monto Const,, A r t , V I I , sec,

?,
H
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within the scope of the governor’s subsequent message to
the assemblyo

Actually, there is no apparent difference

in Montana whether the governor’s request for legislation
is placed in the proclamation or in a subsequent message ;
both are regarded as part of his call*,
The Governor's Proclamation
The Ac C , Mo Company Case
State ex relo Anaconda Copper Mining Company v,
30
Clancy"^ held that certain legislation regarding the dis
qualification of district judges was within the call of
the governor's proclamation since the legislation achieved
"the ends sought to be accomplished in his call."^^
On November 10, 1903? the governor issued a procla
mation convening the eighth legislative assembly in extra
ordinary sessiono

The proclamation stated that the session

was convened in part to secure legislation which would pro
vide for the disqualification of district judges once an
allegation of bias or prejudice was made.^^

Pursuant to

this call the legislature enacted two pieces of legislation
3^30 Mont. 529; 77 P. 312 (1904).
^"*30 Mont. 536.
^^For an insight into the need for this legisla
tion, and the impact it had on the socio-economic and
political problems within Montana, see C. B„ Glasscock,
The War of the Copper Kings (New York: Blue Ribbon Books
Inc., 1965); chap. 20.
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one of which was entitled "An Act to Amend Section 1Ô0 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to the Disqualifi
cation of Judges."

Section 180 was amended by adding Sub

section 4 which provided in part:
When either party makes and files an affi
davit as hereinafter provided, that he has
reason to believe, and does believe, he cannot
have a fair and impartial hearing or trial be
fore a district judge by reason of the bias or
prejudice of such judge. . . , Upon the filing
of the affidavit the judge as to whom said dis
qualification is averred, shall be without author
ity to act further in the action, motion or
proceeding, but the provisions of this section
do not apply to . . . the power of transferring
the action or proceeding to some other court,
nor to the power of calling in another district
judge to sit and act in such action or
proceeding. . . .33
Soon thereafter in Silver Bow County an affidavit
alleging prejudice and bias was filed against District
Judge Clancy; however, Clancy refused to step down, and
instead, proceeded with the trial.

The mining company

upon Clancy's refusal to step down from the case brought
an action under the statute to prohibit him from continuing
on with the case.
In determining whether the legislation was within
the purview of the governor's proclamation, Justice Holloway
noted that it was fairly easy to determine that the
governor's purpose for calling the extra session was to
331903 Laws (E.S.), c. 3, p. 10,
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secure some legislation whereby a district judge could be
charged with entertaining a bias or prejudice and could be
disqualified.

With this purpose apparent, the court held

that the legislation was within the purview of the gover
nor^ s proclamation.
any enactment w h i c h w il l meet the ends
sought to be accom p li s he d in his call must be
deemed to be embraced w i t h i n the limits of the
subjec ts su bmitted f or c o n s i d é r â t i o n .34

The Blackford Case
The other Montana supreme court decision deter
mining whether specific legislation was within the purview
of the governor*s proclamation was Blackford v. Judith Basin
C o u n t y , i n which the court held that certain legislation
granting tax relief was within the call of the governor*s
proclamation.
The J udith B a s i n County commissioners acquired a
tax deed to

land owned by Blackford.

Later,

he made an

offer and demand to p u rchase the land for a sum w h i c h in
cluded the amount of taxes due, plus penalties and interest.
He claimed this right was provided by C ha pter 33 of the
1933-34 E x t r a o r d i n a r y S e ssion w h i c h gr anted to former
pro p er t y owners a p r e f e r e nt i al right to purchase

3430 Mont. 536.
35109 Mont. 570, 98 P.2d 8?2 (1940)
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tax-acquired property.

The board rejected Blackford*s

offer and accepted a higher offer, whereupon Blackford
brought an action against them.
The case presented many issues, one of which was
whether Chapter 33 was within the scope of the governor’s
proclamation.

On this issue, Chief Justice Johnson noted

that the proclamation stated that the ninth purpose for
convening the legislature was "To amend the law in rela
tion to the time for redeeming real estate from tax liens.
Furthermore, he noted that Chapter 33 did not actually
extend the time of redemption from tax liens, but under
certain conditions did "afford an equivalent relief by
enabling the former owner to buy back his property for the
amount of taxes, penalties and interest." 37

He held

therefore that Chapter 33 was related to, and germane to,
the governor’s proclamation since it had "a natural connection" with the subject stated in the proclamation. 3 8
In holding that the legislation was within the purview of
the proclamation, the chief justice quoted the A . C . M,
Company case decision which held that "any enactment which
will meet the ends sought to be accomplished in his call
^^1933-34 Laws (E.S.), p. 3.
^"^109 Mont. 588.
^^109 Mont. 588.
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must be deemed to be embraced within the limits of the
subjects submitted for consideration»"^^
The Governor’s Message
The Sweeney Case
The first Montana supreme court decision deter
mining whether specific legislation was within the call of
the governor’s message was Sweeney v» City of B u t t e , i n
which the court held that the legislation concerning the
recovery of salaries by policemen was within the scope of
the governor’s message.
During the summer of 1919, the governor by procla
mation called a special session of the legislative assembly,
and in his message to the assembly he requested that the
law regarding municipal police departments be reviewed»
During the session the legislature did enact legislation
concerning the recovery of salaries by members of municipal
police forces.

This legislation provided (1) that actions

to recover salaries by members of municipal police depart
ments must be commenced within six months after the cause
of action arose, and (2) that no action could be maintained
by such members except for services actually rendered or
39state ex rel» Anaconda Copper Mining Company v,
Clancy, 30 Mont. 536 {1904), as quoted in 109 Mont » 590»
^ % 4 Mont. 230, 208 P. 943 (1922) »
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for the days when the member would report for dutyo
On May 28, 1920, Sweeney commenced a successful
mandamus proceeding to compel the city of Butte to restore
him to his former position on the police force, with pay
ment of back salary»

Sweeney filed his claim for the back

salary, but the city clerk refused to accept and pay it »
One of the issues in the case was whether Chapter 11
enacted at the 1919 special session was within the scope
of the governor's message as required by Article VII,
section 11, of the Montana constitution»

Commissioner

Comer, who prepared the opinion for the court, held:
The subject of the message or recommendation of
the governor now under consideration is an amend
ment to the law relating to the "department of
police,” for the purpose of obviating certain
conditions in the future, viz», the payment of
salaries where no services are rendered » The
provisions of Chapter 11 pertain to this recom
mendation, but do not go beyond its scope or
purview»42
The Dishman Case
The second Montana supreme court decision resolving
the issue of whether specific legislation was within the
scope of the governor's message was State of Montana v»
D i s h m a n , i n which the court held that legislation
4^1919 Laws (E»S») , c» 11 »
4264 Mont» 239,
^^64 Mont» 530, 210 P» 604 (1922)»
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prohibiting the sale of liquor was within the scope of the
governor^s message which requested additional legislation
for the suppression of the illegal traffic in liquor.
On March 15» 1921, "the governor transmitted to the
assembly while in extra session a special message, in which
he recommended the enactment of further legislation for the
suppression of illegal traffic in intoxicating liquors.
The assembly enacted legislation which prohibited the sell
ing of liquor, and later Dishman was convicted under the
law.^^

He alleged that this law was invalid because the

subject matter was not within the scope of the governor* s
proclamation.
Justice Holloway agreed that the subject matter of
Chapter 9 was not within the scope of the governor*s procla
mation; however, he stated that a "subject submitted by
special message while the assembly is convened in extra
ordinary session is before the assembly for consideration
to the same extent as if specifically mentioned in the
proclamation,**^^

Thus, the court held that since the

governor*s message has the same binding effect on legisla
tion as does the proclamation, Chapter 9 was within the
^^64 Mont. 532.
^^1921 Laws (E.S.), c. 9^^64 Mont, 532.
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scope of the governor*s call»
The Pierson Case
Pierson v. Hendricksen^’^ held that legislation pro
viding for the creation of new school districts was within
the scope of the governor* s message which requested legis
lation providing for the consolidation of school districts»
Pierson, a resident and a taxpayer in a newly
created high school district, brought an action to enjoin
the issuance and sale of bonds for improvements to the
county high school.

He claimed that Chapter 47 which pro

vided for the creation of new school districts was not
within the purview of the governor*s proclamation.
Justice Angstman, for the court, took note that
the **general subject of consolidating school districts was
submitted by the message of December 7,” which he held con
ferred upon the legislative assembly the authority "to
pass legislation effecting consolidation of school districts
for all p u r p o s e s . I n addition he stated that such
"consolidations would in effect create new districts
In conclusion, the court held that Chapter 47 was within
the purview of the governor*s proclamation since the
4790 Mont. 244, 3Ô P.2d 991 (1934).
^^90 Mont. 250.
499g Mont. 250,
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governor’s message has the same binding authority as does
his proclamation.
Summary
The Montana constitution has placed considerable
power in the governor by providing that all legislation
enacted during an extra session must be within the gover
nor’s call--that is, the governor’s proclamation convening
the special session or one of the governor’s subsequent
messages to the assembly.

This constitutional power

possessed by the governor gives him real power to control
the direction of the legislation to be enacted by the
special session.

It would appear to be in the best interest

of state government for the state courts to liberally inter
pret this provision so as to increase both the governor’s
and the legislative assembly’s power by enlarging the
general subject areas in which the legislature must act.
Thus, it is in the best interest of Montana government for
the Montana supreme court to exercise a mode of interpre
tation, in the absence of clear constitutional or statutory
direction, that will also liberally interpret this consti
tutional provision.

On this point it is my belief that the

language of the A. C. M. Company decision should continue to
be controlling
. . . any enactment which will meet the ends
sought to be accomplished in his call must be
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dee med to be embraced w i th i n the limits of
the subjects submitted for c o n s i d e r a t i o n , 50
The five cases before the court on this subject
of w h e t h e r certain le gislation was w i t h i n the call of the
g ov e rn o r' s p ro c l a m a t i o n have prese nted relatively easy
situations f o r the court to rule and hold that the l e g i s 
lation in quest io n w a s w i t h i n the g o v e r n o r ’s call.
ren d e r i n g these decisions,

In

the court has not been r e s t r i c 

tive in its exercise of its mode of interpretation, and
the r ef o re it is pos sible to conclude f or the purposes of
this study that all five cases have as sisted in strengthening this p ow e r w h i c h the g o vernor possesses by c on s t i t u 
tion al grant.
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CHAPTER V
PARDON POWER

Intro du c ti o n
A r ticle VIIj

se ction 9? of the Montana constitu

tio n vests the power to pardon in the office of the
governor.

H o w e v e r , before the g o vernor can exercise this

power, the pro posed a ction must be approved by the state
board of pardons.

In accordance w i t h the constitution,

app r ov a l by the board need not be unanimous;

the

a simple

m aj o r i t y is sufficient.
The p ardon p ower is the c onstitutionally defined
power vested in the go v ernor w h i c h allows the executive to
grant pardons,
punishment;
criminal

a bs olute or conditional; commutations of

and re prieves for any offense against the

laws of Montana.

A pardon is a decla r at i on by

the g o ve r no r w h i c h releases the offender fr om all p u n i s h 
ment for the offense and f ro m the disabilities which would
occur upon conviction.

A c ommutation of sentence is a

substitution of a lesser punishment for a gr eater p u n i s h 
ment.

A reprieve postpones for a definite time execur ion

of a sentence.

The M o n t a n a governor's pard on power also

includes the power to suspend or to remit the collection
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of a fine or f o r f e i t u r e .
$

O pe r a ti o n and Effect of Pardon
Ge neral
A p a r d o n operates d i re c tl y on bot h the punishment
for the offense and the guilt of the offender.,

In a full

pardon, the p u n is h me n t and guilt of the offender are com
p le t e l y erased so that the la w treats the offender as if
he had never co mmitted the o f f e n s e .
don,

the punishment

is suspended, a lt h o u g h the guilt r e 

mains as do all the di sabilities
tion.

In a conditional p a r 

inherent in the convic

A conditional p a r d o n wi l l in effect become a full

p ar d on once the conditions of the pardon have been p e r 
formed ; however,

until th ey are performed,

the Mo n t a n a

supreme court has held that a conditional pardon has an
effect similar to that of a p a r o l e .^
The S u tt o n Case
The only M o n t a n a su preme court decision to discuss
the effect of a conditi o na l par don was In Re Sutton,

2

w h i c h held that a c onditional pa rdon is similar to a p a r o l e ,
so that one who receives a condi tional p a r d o n from the
g ov e r n o r is r e le a s e d only f r o m the punishment--not f r o m the
judgment of convic ti o n as he w o u l d hav e been had he
TIn R e Sutton,
2 5 0 Mont.

50 M o n t . 88,

145 P» 6

(1914)

88.
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r ec e iv e d a full or a bs olute pardon*
Sutton,

an attorney, wa s convicted of forgery and

sentenced to two years in the state prison*
v iction and in a cc o rd a nc e w i t h a statute,

Up on his con 

Sutton was p r e 

sente d w i t h a show cause order f r o m the M o nt a na supreme
court to show cause w h y he should not be disbarred *^
S ut ton^s an s we r to the c o u r t ’s show cause order was that
the g o ve r no r had issued an executive order pardoning him*
The pardon, however, was conditional by its very language
S u t t o n argued that
o o * the effect of the pa r do n is not only to
release h i m f r o m the punishment inflicted by
the judgment of conviction, but that it o b l i t e r 
ates, in legal contemplation, the offense itself
and restores hi m to the same standing in the
commun ity as if the offense had never been com
mitted» 5
In other words,

he m ai n ta i ne d that the judgment of co n vi c 

tion was canceled by his pardon and could not serve as a

^Mont, Rev* Codes, sec » 6409 (190?)»
In case of
the conviction of an at t o r n e y and co unselor of a felony
or misdemeanor, i nv o l v i n g moral turpitude, the clerk of
the court in w h i c h such convi ction is had shall, w i t h i n
t hirty days thereafter, transmit to the supreme court a
certified copy of the record of conviction»
^The conditions of the pardon w er e that Sutton
(1) must make a w r i t t e n report mo n t h l y to the secretary of
the board of p a rd o ns s t ating his address, nature of work,
employer, etc», (2) shall not be g u il t y of any breach of
law, and a bstain from the use of i n t o x i c at i ng liquors,
(3) must p rovide for his w i f e and children, and (4) shall
rema in in the legal cu stody of the state board of prison
commissioners»
5 5 0 Mont»

91, 92o
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ba sis for the disbarment

proceeding «

C hi e f Justice Brantly^

s pe aking for che c o u r t „ held

that the pardon gr an ted to S utton was conditional^ having
the same effect as a paroleo
T he act of the g ov e r n o r o . « t ho u gh d e s i g 
nated by h im as a pardon, is closely assimilated
to a paroleo . . » A par ole does not operate to
w i p e out the judgment of conviction but merely
suspends its operation by remitting, for the time
being, the confinement and hard labor, until the
end of the terra, or until an u n conditional p ar 
don is g r a n t e d .6
The court held that the g o v e r n o r 's imposition of the c o nd i 
tions in the pa r do n implied the existence of a judgment
w h i c h could not be canceled until the conditions in the
pard on had b ee n p e r f o r m e d .

Thus,

the judgment of c o nv i c

tion rem ained and could serve as a basis f o r the disbarment
proceedingo
Summ ary
In the Su t t o n case, the governor granted to Sutton
a pardon w h i c h was conditional by its very naturec.

The

court held as a matter of interpretation that the pardon
was,

in effect,

s i m i l a r to a p a r o l e .

have granted Sutton a full pardon,

The governor could

but instead he gr anted

a p ar d on w i t h speci fic conditions attachedo
The court *s o pinion respects the governor's pardon

^50 Mont. 94o
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power0

The court held that when the governor grants a par

don with conditionss the pardon is in effect a parole which
suspends the

punishment but does not cancel the judgment of

convictiono

In the Sutton case,the court hasexercised a

mode of interpretation in the absence of clear constitutional
or statutory direction, and has clearly defined the effect
of a conditional pardon, while at the same time it has
respected the governor''s pardon power.
Encroachments upon the
Encroachment by the

Pardon Power
Judiciary

General
When the constitution vests the pardon power in the
governor, as in Montana, the courts have no jurisdiction
in criminal eases to exercise this power.

The Montana

supreme court, on two different occasions, has been pre
sented with questions concerning the judiciary’s relation
ship to, and possible encroachment upon, the governor’s
pardon power.

In both cases the decisions, in part, focused

on the district court’s implementation of Montana’s sus
pended sentence statute.
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The R e i d Case
The first of these two cases was S t at e ex relo
R e i d Vo D i strict C o u r t ,^ in w h i c h the court held that a
trial court lacked

jurisdiction to m o di f y a judgment after

it had be en p r on o u n c e d and af ter the de fendant had started
serving the s e n t e n c e .

S u c h a m o d i f i c a t i o n would be an

encroachment by the district court upon the executive's
constit u ti o na l pardon power.
Reid was sentenced to si x months in jail and fined
$500o

He w a s then committed to the county jail and after

he had served eight days of his sentence the district
court entered an order reducing the sentence and j u d g m e n t .
Chief Justice Ca ll a wa y s t a t e d , for the court ^
that M o n t a n a ’s suspended sentence statute

allowed the

court to suspend the execution of a sentence ^ but ruled
that this power must be exercised at the time the sentence
w as pronounced.

'^68 Monto

The district court ^ by ma k i n g the

112.

^Monto ReVo C o d e s , s e c . 1207^ (Choate 1 9 2 1 )o
In
all prosecutions f o r crimes or mi s demeanors ^ excep* as
h er e in a ft e r p r o v i d e d , w h e r e the defendant has pleaded or
been found gu i lt y . . . and it appears that the defendant
has never before bee n imprisoned fo r crime . o <> and wh e re
it app ears to the s at i s f a c t i o n of the court that the c h a r 
a cter of the defendant and c ir c um s ta n ce s of the case are
such that he is not likely again to engage in an offensive
course of conduct . . . said court ma y suspend the e x e c u 
tion of the se ntence and place the defendant on prcbation. . . .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91
m o d i f i c a t i o n after the defendant began ser ving his s e n 
tence, had "sought to exercise a power w h i c h the C o n s t i 
t ut i on repo ses in the gover n or and board of pardons
The court concluded that since the constitution had granted
the p a r d o n power to the executive it could not be e x e r 
cised by the judiciary.
The S h ee h a n Case
The oth er M o n t a n a supreme court decision d i s c u s s 
ing the j u d i c i a r y ’s encroachment upon the e x e c u t i v e ’s
p ardon power was E x Parte S h e e h a n ,^^ in w h i c h the court
held,

on a collateral issue,

that w h e n a justice court

imposed a condition upon a su spended sentence,

such an

a ction constituted an encroachment upon the g o v e r n o r ’s
pardon power.
Sheehan ple aded g ui l ty to a m is d em e an o r charge and
was given a suspended sentence by the justice of the peace
in D ee r Lodge County,

on the condition that Sh e eh a n "leave

and remain out of D e er Lodge C o u n t y . " ^ ^
On the issue r ai s ed by S h ee h an w h e t h e r the co n di 
tion a t tached to the suspended sentence was an encroachment

Mont.

312.

^°100 Mont.

244, 49 P . 2d 438

'’'*100 Mont.

249.

(1935)
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upon the pardon p o w e r 5, Justice Matthews,
court,

speaking for the

held that the condition had no force or effect since

it was in the n ature of a pardon on condition which could
only be exercised b y the governoro

".

. . Su c h r e m i t 

tance of judgment after sentence is in the nature of a

12

p ardon on condition rather than p u n i s h m e n t T h u s , the
court held that the justice court had tried to exercise the
governor's pardon p ow e r w h e n it made the suspended sentence
cond itional upon the defendant ^s exile fr o m the county»
Summary
The Mo n t a n a su preme c o u r t ’s decisions in both the
R ei d and S h e e h a n cases have exercised a mode of i n terpre
tation in the abse nce of clear constitutional or statutory
d ir e ction w h i c h has strengthened the governor's pardon
power since it has prohibited a n other branch of government
from exercising this power^
illustrated that

The court in both cases has

it commands an u nd erstanding of what the

pardon power is, an d what constitutes an encroachment, upon
this power »
The court ri g h t l y held in the Reid case t h a t , after
the defendant a c tu a l l y be g a n serving his sentence,

the e x e 

cution of the sentence could not be interfered w i t h unless
b y the g o v e r n o r ’s exercise of his pardon power or by appeal,

1^100 Monte

255
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A nd the court c o rr e ct l y held in the She ehan case t h a t ,
a lt h o u g h the justice court had the authority to suspend
the sentence,

it did not have the au t ho r it y to put such a

condition on the suspended sentence since the pronouncement
of such a condition exceeded its ju risdiction and entered
the domain of the g o v e r n o r ’s par don power.
E nc r oa c hm e nt b y the Legislature
Ge neral
W h e n the M o n t a n a co ns titution vested the pardon
power in the governor,

it p re s um a bl y excluded the legis-

lature f r o m exe rcising this power.
lature can by statute

13

However, the l e g i s 

confer upon a court the power to s u s 

pend the execution of a sentence if the discretion of the
court does not usurp the g o v e r n o r ’s pardon power.

The B o t t o m l y Case
The only Mo n tana supreme court decisi on w h i c h has
discussed the p o s s i b il i ty of the l e g i s l a t u r e ’s encroachment
of the e x e c u t i v e ’s pardon power appears to have been State
ex rel. B o t t o m l y v. D i strict C o u r t . ^5 in w hi c h the court
held that the M o n t a n a ’’susp ended s e nt e n c e ” statute does not

^ ^ M o n t . Const., A r t . IV,
Jur., Pardon secs. 21, 34.
^ 4 3 9 Am.

Jur.,

sec.

Pardon sec.

l.

See also

33.

^^73 Mont. 541, 237 P. 525 (1925).
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impinge upon the g o v e r n o r ’s pa rdoning power.
On D e c e m b e r

13s

1924s

R as m u s s e n was sentenced to

be imprisoned in the county jail for 60 days and fined
$200.

On the same day he app ealed the convict ion^ and the

appeal w a s di s missed on M a y
May

15? the district

placed R a s m u s s e n

14,

1925.

The next day.

court suspended the sentence and

on probation.

One of the quest.ions bef'c _ e

the court w as w h e t h e r the l e g i s l a t u r e ’s enactment

of the

su spended sen tence statute was an encroachment upon the
g o v e r n o r ’s pardon power.
Justice Hollowayj

speaking for the c o u r t , noted

that the first legislative a ss e mb l y had enacted a suspended
sentence statute?

no t wi t h s t a n d i n g the constitutional pro -

vision e stablishing the e x e c u t i v e ’s pardon power.

He

fu rther noted that since tnen the legislature had rui t o .
other occasions

enacted legislation providing f o r

the

pension of sentences.
Thus It will be seen that fr o m the o r g a n i 
zation of M o n t a n a as a terri tory to the present
time— a period of sixty-one years--It has been
assumed by all d e partments of our g o v e r n m e n t ,
and the a s s u m p t i o n has been acted u p o n , that the
legislative b r a n c h of government had authority
to provide for the s uspension of the e.xecution
of a judgment in a criminal c a s e , and the l e g i s 
lature has assumed to exercise the authority in
at least three instances since the Const itut ion
w as a d o p t e d . ^^

1673 Mont. 548
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The Montana court argued,

in addit ion, that Che

terms "pardon," "commutation" and "respite" as found in
Article VII, section 9, of the state consC ita*: ion were
not "intended to comprehend the suspension of the exe"ution of a judgment."

17

Justice Holloway noted that the

Montana suspended sentence statute did not make the
defendant a free man; instead, he was "in effect serving
his sentence, though not within the prison walls,"

1S

Thin

the court concluded that the Montana statute was not an
encroachment upon the governor’s pardon power and thereto :
was a valid legislative enactment.
Summary
The decision in tne Bottomly case fails clearly
to distinguish the difference between the effec" of a s u
pended sentence and the effect of a reprie-e which, c,i
course, is within the domain of the governor ’s parJr ,-i
power.

The purpose to be achieved by the suspended sent ,

statute is to allow a first offender to be released

■\n.

probation in those cases where the circumstan:es dir cate
that such a release will not endanger the pub 1 i: sai'^ iy,
A suspended sentence in effect postpones the execu:i'n o :
the sentence.

But so does a reprieve, so what is tne

Mont. 549.
^^73 Mont. 5^9, 550,
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d ifference?

Apparentlyj

the difference is that a repr ieve

postp on e s the ex e cution of the sentence for a definite
time, w h er e a s a suspended sentence postpones the exe cution
of the sentence for an indefinite time; that is, the time
during w h i c h the offen d er obeys the laws and conditions
imposed b y the court.

The court was not at all clear on

this point.
However,

had the court e f fectively distinguished

b et ween a suspended sentence and a reprieve,

legislative

enactment of the suspended sentence statute would not
a ppear to be an encroachment upon the e x e c u t i v e ’s pardon
power;

the legislature should have the power to invest ce r 

tain di s cr e t i o n in the judiciary so long as this discretion
is not an e n croachment upon the g o v e r n o r ’s pardon power.
The court should have the d i s c r e t i o n a r y power to suspend
the sentence of a first offender where it believes the
suspension to be in the best interest of all the parties
concerned.

However,

this power should not be established

until it is s a t i s f a c t o r i l y d is t in g ui s he d from the governor's
reprieve power.
E ncroachment

by the State B oa r d of Pardons

General
W h e n the M o n t a n a
p ower in the governor,

c o n s t i tu t io n vested the pardon

it r e qu i re d the state board of p a r 

dons to act in concert w i t h the g ov e r n o r in e xercising this
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power.

The constitution provides that the governor shall

be advised by the board and that the actions of the gover
nor must be approved by the board.

However, although the

board has the power to advise and approve, this does not
invest the board with the power to perform the pardon
function per se.
The Herman-Roy Case
The only Montana supreme court decision to discuss
the state board of pardon*s encroachment on the executive’s
19
pardon power was State ex rel. Herman and Roy v, Powell,
in which the court held that the state board of pardons
could not grant a parole to a subsequent escape sentence
and thereby extinguish a former sentence; such a discharge
of a former sentence would in effect be an exercise of, and
an encroachment upon, the governor’s pardon power.
Herman was serving a five-year prison sentence at
the time he escaped in July, 195Ô; Roy was serving a sixyear sentence when he escaped in November, 195^»

Each con

vict was captured soon after his escape, pleaded guilty to
the escape charge and received a one-year sentence on the
escape charge.

Later, at different times in 1959, each

was paroled subject to serving out his time of the escape
sentence.

After serving the minimum time, each was paroled

^^139 Mont, 5^3, 367 P.2d 553 (1961).
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on his escape sentence.

In 196O, each violated the condi

tions of his parole and was returned to the state prison.
Herman and Roy each contended that the board’s grant of
the parole to the escape sentence resulted in a discharge
of the original sentence.
The court rejected this argument of the petitioners
as to the effect of their paroles on the original sentences.
Justice John Harrison, for the court, ruled;
. . . /no Montana statut^ gives the /state board
of pardon/7 power to extinguish a former sentence
by paroling a man to a subsequent sentence. To
sustain such an argument would have the effect of
granting to the Board the right to pardon or com
mute a sentence. This, of course, cannot be done
because the exclusive power to pardon and commute
a sentence rests in the office of the g o v e r n o r . 20
The court noted that a parole releases a convict from con
finement before the expiration of his sentence, but that
it does not change his status as a prisoner.

In other

words, the parole does not suspend the prisoner’s sentence,
it merely substitutes a shorter confinement.

In so hold

ing, the court took note of a statute which states in
part:

, . A parole shall be ordered only for the best

interest of society, not as an award of clemency; it shall
not be considered a reduction of sentence or pardon, , .

2^139 Mont. 586, 587.
^^Mont. Rev, Codes, sec. 94-9832 (1947)
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Thus, the Montana court held that paroling a man to a sub
sequent sentence does not extinguish an earlier sentence
since such a discharge would be tantamount to granting a
pardon which the state board of pardons, without the
governor, cannot do.
Summary
The court^ s mode of interpretation, in the absence
of clear constitutional or statutory direction, in the
Herman-Roy case has strengthened the governor’s pardon
power since it has prohibited the board of pardons from
exercising this power without the governor’s involvement.
Again the Montana supreme court has illustrated that it
understands what constitutes an encroachment upon this
power.

Although the state board of pardons has the author

ity to advise the governor regarding pardons and the respon
sibility to approve all pardons, it nevertheless does not
have the authority to discharge a former sentence by
paroling a convict to a subsequent escape sentence since
such a discharge would be similar to a pardon or commuta
tion of sentence which would be an exercise of the gover
nor’s pardon power.
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Summary
On five different occasions the Montana supreme
court has rendered decisions concerning the Montana
governor's pardon power.

In all five of these decisions,

the Montana court has exercised a mode of interpreta
tion, in the absence of clear constitutional or statu
tory direction, which has respected the governor's pardon
power.

In four out of five of these decisions it has

directly strengthened the executive*s pardon power, and it
could have strengthened the power in the fifth case—
the Bottomly case— had it distinguished clearly between a
suspended sentence and a reprieve,

^11 in all the court

has demonstrated an understanding of the pardon power and,
furthermore, has prohibited the judiciary and an executive
board from encroaching upon this constitutionally defined
power.

The court’s work could have been complete had it

illustrated in the Bottomly case why a suspended sentence
statute was different from a reprieve so as to clarify why
the statute was not an encroachment on the governor’s
pardon power.
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CHAPTER VI
MILITIA POWER:

EXECUTIVE USE OF TROOPS

TO SUPPRESS INSURRECTION
Introduction
The militia power of the Montana governor is
defined in Article VII, section 6, of the state constitu
tion which provides that the governor shall have the power
to call out any part or all of the militia "to aid in the
execution of the laws, to suppress insurrection or to
repel invasion."^

The militia power, for the purposes

of this study, can best be defined as the executive*s
"use of troops in aid of civil authorities."

2

When the governor exercises this militia power to
suppress a riot, but does not declare martial law, he acts
as a civil officer and directs the military forces in
accordance with the law.

Under this condition, the mili

tary acts as a major police force and could, if need be,
arrest and detain rioters until the disturbance is sup
pressed,

However, when the governor declares martial law.
^Mont. Const., Art. VII, sec. 6.

^Thurman Arnold, "Martial Law," Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences. ed. Edwin R. A. Seligman, X (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 194Ô), p. 162.
101
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"the civil status of the state is su spended and the governor
acts in a m i l i t a r y capacity as commander in chief of the
m il i ta r y forces,"^

It appears that the usual test of d e t e r 

m ining w h e t h e r ma r t i a l law is in existence is w hether or
not the courts r emain open»^

The Use of Troops in Aid of
Civil Authorities
General
Labor troubles in Butte in 1914 furnished the
governor w i t h an occasi on to exercise his militia power:
to use the militia to aid the local law enforcement a u t h o r 
ities in Si l ve r B o w County.

Du r in g the same year, a

challenge of the govern or's exercise of this p ower reached
the M on t an a supreme court in the natio n al l y known case of
In Re M c D o n a l d ,^ w h i c h determined the limits of the
militia power.
The M c Donald Case
In the M c D o n a l d case, the court held that the
governor th rough his c o ns t itutional militia power could not
33 6 Am. J u r , , M i l i t a r y sec. 4 6 .

4Por a brief discussion of martial law, its defini
tions, dimensions and effects, see Thurman Arnold, op. cit .
162-16 6 ,
In addition see notes in 9Ô Am. St. Rep. 772 (1904)
Ann. Gas. 1914C 22, 65 L.R.A. 193 (1904), and 12 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 979 (1 9 O Ô ) .
pp.

^49 Mont.

454, 143 P. 947 (1914).
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declare martial law and thereby transfer the judicial func
tion to a military commission,.

On September 1, 1911, the

governor by proclamation declared that Silver Bow County
was in a state of insurrection and under martial law.

On

September 12, McDonald and others filed writs of habeas
corpus alleging that they were being unlawfully detained
by Major Donohue, the commander of the militia which the
governor had ordered in to aid the local authorities in the
suppression of the insurrection.

Donohue replied that the

detention was necessary because McDonald and the others were
leaders of the insurrection.

On September 24, GiUis filed

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging unlawful
detention by virtue of a commitment issued by a summary
court set up by the military authorities, while all the
district courts were open and actively attending to their
business.

The commitment of Gillis was defended as a valid

exercise of authority authorized by the governor’s procla
mation of martial law.

The Montana court joined both

actions applying for writs of habeas corpus and heard them
together.
The case raised two issues in an almost classical
fashion and with reference to the detention of McDonald and
the others who petitioned the court on September 12, Jus
tice Sanner held that McDonald and the others were properly
detained under the authority of the governor’s proclamation
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was valid and justifiable under Article VII, section 5,
of the Montana constitution, and properly conferred lawful
authority on the actions of the militia in arresting and
detaining McDonald and the others.
With reference to the second issue— Gillis*s trial

before a military tribunal. Justice Sanner held that the
governor did not have the constitutional authority to
establish a form of martial law which would authorize the
conviction of a citizen without a trial by jury.
. . . neither Æ h e governor7 nor the military
under him can lawfully punish for insurrection
or for other violations of the law. The courts
cannot be ousted by the agencies detailed to
aid them; nor can their functions be transferred
to tribunals unknown to the Constitution,^
Thus, the court held that although the governor may impose
a certain degree of military rule during an insurrection,
he has no authority to proclaim absolute martial law which
means the abrogation of all constitutional guaranties,
thereby granting jurisdiction to military tribunals to con
vict civilians without a trial by jury.
Liability for Oppressive or
Destructive Acts
General
The existence and implementation of the governor's
militia power neither authorizes military license, nor
^49 Mont, 477 (1914).
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places the lives or property of citizens under the absolute
control of the military.

When the militia power is used

to oppress citizens or to destroy property, the party
responsible for such action will be held accountable.

Thus,

a reckless or destructive act ordered or executed by the
commander will establish his liability for the damages;
however, if an order to a subordinate to commit a destruc
tive act was lawful or reasonable on its face, the subordi7
nate who carries out the order will not be held liable.
The Herlihy Case
The other Montana decision involving the governor's
g
militia power was Herlihy v, Donohue, which illustrated
the proposition that officers may be held responsible for
damages resulting from arbitrary orders calling for the
destruction of private property, but that subordinate
officers could not refuse to carry out orders which were
valid on their face, and therefore their actions in obedi
ence were justifiable and released them from liability.
The fact situation in the Herlihy case was born
out of the same labor dispute in Butte in 1914 which caused
the governor, on September 1, to declare that Silver Bow
County was in a state of insurrection.

During the military

736 Am, Jur., Military, secs, II6 , 117.
^52 Mont. 601, 161 P. 164 (1916).
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occupation, on September 19, Major Donohue ordered his
subordinate officers and a few enlisted men to destroy
the stock of liquor in Herlihy*s saloon because Herlihy
had violated Donohue*s orders by opening his saloon and
selling some liquor during the curfew*
Justice Holloway held that the military’s destruc
tion of Herlihy*s property was not justifiable as a valid
use of the militia power since there was no proof that the
destruction of private property was imminently and over
whelmingly necessary.

In so holding he stated that the

militia during the insurrection performed the function of
a strong arm of the governor by aiding in executing the
law and in suppressing the insurrection, and therefore the
militia was bound by the same authority which binds the
governor.
Independently of the executive /the militia7 had
no power or authority, except possibly with
reference to its own internal affairs* It acted
as an executive agency, subject to the orders of
the governor and bound by the authority which he
might lawfully exercise. The governor is at all
times amenable to the Constitution and laws of
the state. They are the charters of his powers
and in them he must find the authority for his
official a c t s * 9
Thus the court held that since the militia was bound to the
same authority which binds the governor, the militia was
bound by the constitution and state laws and therefore the
952 Mont. 609.
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officers of the militia— but not the subordinates— would
be held liable for any damages to private property which
could not be justified under state law.

With reference

to the subordinate officers, the court held that since
Donohue*s order was valid and reasonable of its face, the
subordinates who acted in obedience to the order were
released from liability since their actions in obedience
were required.
Summary
The Montana supreme court has twice exercised a
mode of interpretation, in the absence of clear consti
tutional or statutory direction, which has strengthened
the Montana governor*s militia power to the extent that
the court has recognized that the constitution vests emer
gency powers in the governor.

The McDonald decision

affirmed the existence and use of the militia, while it
defined the limits of this power and held that the gover
nor could not declare martial law per se.

This decision

illustrates among other things that the Montana consti
tution does not provide that the governor may declare
martial law and thereby supplant the authority of the
civil courts.
"martial law,"

Nowhere does the constitution use the words
This decision can also be viewed as a

contest between the executive and judicial branches of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

108
state government with the outcome being that the judiciary
prevailed over the executive.

The Herlihy decision again

affirmed the existence and use of the militia power, while
it held that an excessive use of this power— the unwar
ranted destruction of private property— would cause the
officer giving the order for the destruction to be liable
for any resulting damages.

Thus the court has been prag

matic in affirming the existence and proper use of this
power, while it has been wise to hold that the exercise of
this power must fall within the constitutionally defined
limits of the executive's powers.
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CHAPTER VII
SUCCESSION
Introduction
The constitution of 1Ô89 evidently sought to anti
cipate all contingencies which might arise in succession
to the governorship.

Article Vll, section 14, of the

Montana constitution^ appeared to grant the right of guber
natorial succession to the lieutenant-governor. The sec
tion appeared to provide for a successor in almost any con
tingency so that the administration of the executive depart
ment would not be placed in jeopardy.

Yet the first

occasion for succession to the balance of a gubernatorial
term vacated by resignation precipitated litigation and
required the supreme court to rule whether the provisions
were in fact clear and comprehensive.
The Lamey Case

On March 13, 1933, after serving as governor for
only a couple of months. Governor Erickson resigned,
1Mont. Const., Art, Vll, sec. 14. In case of the
failure to qualify, the impeachment or conviction of felony
or infamous crime of the governor, or his death, removal
from office, resignation, absence from the state, or in
ability to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the powers, duties and emoluments of the office, for the
residue of the term, or until the disability shall cease,
shall devolve upon the lieutenant-governor.
109
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whereupon Lieutenant-Governor Cooney assumed the office and
powers of the governor.

State ex rel. Lamey v, Mitchell^

soon held that upon a governor's resignation, his powers
and duties were immediately transferred to the lieutenantgovernor,

The question before the court was whether there

was a vacancy in the office of governor to be filled by a
special election.

Lamey and others argued that there was

a vacancy and that the secretary of state should be com
pelled to put their names on the ballot.
The opinion of the court, written by district judge
McKinnon sitting in place of Justice Angstraan, noted the
constitutional provision that if the governor should
resign, "the powers, duties and emoluments of the office,
for the residue of the term . . • shall devolve upon the
lieutenant-governor."^

From this constitutional provision,

the court held:
. , . when the Governor resigns or is permanently
removed from office, there is no vacancy in the
office of Governor in the sense that there is no
one left with power to discharge the duties im
posed upon the Governor. . . . The framers of the
Constitution never intended that there should be
any interim in which the affairs of the state should
not be executed, for they said in explicit language
that on the happening of any of the contingencies
mentioned in section 14, supra, the powers, duties
and emoluments of the office were to be immediately
transferred to the Lieutenant-Governor, who is then
297 Mont. 252, 34 P.2d 369 (1934).
^97 Mont. 256.
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given a mandate to discharge the duties of the
office for the residue of the term for which the
Governor was elected. He, as LieutenantGovernor, acts as Governor and is empowered to
perform the duties of that o f f i c e . 4
Summary
The Lamey case said, in effect, that the very
existence of the lieutenant-governorship was intended to
prevent a situation in which there would be no one left
to discharge the duties imposed upon the governor.

To

argue, as Lamey had, that a vacancy occurred upon the
resignation of the governor, seemed to disregard the prima
facie intent of the constitutional draftsmen.^

In sus

taining the argument that a vacancy existed upon the
governor’s resignation, the court would have placed the
administration of the executive branch in jeopardy.

Ob

viously, that was not the intention of the draftsmen.
Instead, the intention would appear to provide for an
efficient right of succession upon any of the mentioned
acts in section 14.
The court’s decision strengthened the office and
^97 Mont, 256, 257.
% u t in a few states, the lieutenant-governor does
not succeed to full office and powers of the governorship
upon the death of the elected governor. In these few
states, a special election is called to elect a new
governor.
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powers of the governor since it has held that upon certain
defined contingencies the gubernatorial office and powers
will be executed by the lieutenant-governor.

Had the

court held that a vacancy existed in the office of the
governor, this decision would have weakened the office
since it would possibly have jeopardized the administra
tion of the executive branch and the execution of the laws
during the time the vacancy remained in effect.
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CHAPTER VIII
MISCELLANEOUS POWERS
This chapter reviews four additional powers of the
governor which the Montana supreme court has had to con
sider.

The powers are: (1) to call in a district judge,

(2) to approve state contracts, (3) discretionary extra
dition power, and (4) to proclaim elections.
The Power to Call in a District Judge
The Smith Case
The Montana supreme court has decided two cases,
both fairly recent, which considered whether the governor,
upon the application of any interested person, properly
exercised his statutory power to call a district judge
into a neighboring judicial district.
V,

State ex rel. Smith

District Court^ held that the governor exceeded his

statutory authority to call in a district judge from a
neighboring judicial district when under a statute the dis
qualified resident judges still had the primary authority
and responsibility to call in a judge from a neighboring
district.
^116 Mont. 251, 151 P.2d 500 (1944).
113
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On December 13, 1943» Judge Horsky of department
no, 1 of the first Judicial district ordered a temporary
injunction to be issued in an abatement case.

The next

day, an affidavit of disqualification was filed against
him so he transferred the case to Judge Padbury of
department no, 2 where the injunction was dissolved.
Judge Padbury then planned to be absent from the state for
about a month, whereupon the county attorney on December 18
disqualified him.

On the same day the acting governor, in

the absence of the governor, called in Judge Lynch from
another district in accordance with section 8823
side in the case.

2

to pre

On December 28, Judge Lynch appeared

but declined to assume jurisdiction of the case on the
ground that under section 8868^ Judge Horsky, and not the
governor, had the authority to call in another judge.
In delivering the opinion of the court. Justice Morris
If for any cause a district court is not or cannot
be held in any county by the judge or judges thereof, or by
a district judge requested by such judge or judges to hold
such court, or if the business of the court in any county
is not or cannot be dispatched with reasonable promptness,
the governor may, upon application of any interested per
son, by an order in writing, require some district judge to
hold court in said county for such time as may be specified
in the order. Mont. Rev. Codes, sec. 8823 (1935),
^Mont, Rev. Codes, sec, 8868 (1935), This is a
very lengthy statute providing for the disqualification of
a district judge and for the calling in of another judge
if no judge or judges in the district remains able to per
form the judicial duties.
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stated that he believed it was improper for the governor
to call in Judge Lynch, in accordance with section ÔÔ23,
"while the power granted by section ÔÔ6Ô has not been ex
hausted."^

Consequently, the court held that the governor

should not have called Judge Lynch because: (1) while Judge
Padbury was in the district, he had the primary responsi
bility to call in another judge, and (2) while Judge Pad
bury was absent from the state, the authority and responsi
bility to call in another judge was vested in Judge Horsky
who had remained at all times within the district.

Thus,

the court held that the governor should not have called in
Judge Lynch under section 6Ô23, since the powers under
section ÔÔ6Ô to call in a neighboring judge had not been
exhausted by the judges within the judicial district.
The Bennett Case
State ex rel. Bennett v. Bonner^ held that the
statute which authorizes the governor to require some dis
trict judge to hold court in another district does not em
power the governor to divest the duly elected and qualified
district judge of his authority and jurisdiction.
The governor had issued executive orders directing
two district judges from other judicial districts to come
^116 Mont. 256.
^123 Mont. 414, 214 P.2d 747 (1950).
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into the fifth judicial district to "hold court" in the
counties comprising the fifth judicial district "until the
business of the court therein has been dispatched."^
Bennett, the judge of the fifth judicial district, com
menced an original proceeding and sought a writ of prohi
bition to restrain the two visiting district judges from
proceeding under the governor*s executive orders.

In

bringing this action, Bennett asserted among other things
that (1) the executive orders disregarded Article IV,
section 1, of the Montana constitution which defines the
separation of powers within Montana government, and (2) there
was no statutory authority empowering the governor to make
the orders.
Chief Justice Adair at the beginning of the majority
opinion noted that the governor*s "general authority is
narrowly limited by the Constitution."^

After he reviewed

all the constitutional provisions, he held that there was
"no provision of the constitution empowering the governor
Ô
to make the executive orders in questions."
In addition,
he held that there were no statutory enactments which would
authorize the making of the executive orders which would
^As quoted in 123 Mont. 417*
^123 Mont. 423.
^123 Mont. 428.
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authorize the governor to "require some district judge to
9
hold court" in another county under certain conditions.
However he stated that this statute neither authorized
"the governor to exclude or remove from office the duly
elected, qualified and acting judge of the district, nor
to fix the terms of c o u r t . ^

To hold otherwise, he said,

"would place the business of the courts at the mercy of
11
the chief executive,"
While present in his district and qualified and
capable, he may not be divested of his authority
and jurisdiction by an executive order of the
governor and be forced to abdicate and stand
aside while others take over his office and perform
the duties imposed upon him by the constitution
and necessarily attendant upon the office of dis
trict judge of the fifth judicial district.
Under our constitution it is from the supreme
court of this state rather than from the supreme
executive power of the state that relief is to be
had where a district court or a district judge is
in error or in need of superintending guidance or
correction,^ ^
In holding that the governor was acting without
authority to issue the executive orders, the chief justice
concluded:
The inappropriateness of having an executive
department administer the business affairs of
"%ont, Rev. Codes, sec. 93-312 (1947 ). This is
the same statute that was cited in the Smith case as Mont
Rev. Codes, sec, SS23 (1935).
^^123 Mont. 429.
^^123 Mont. 431.
^^123 Mont. 434.
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the court is manifest. The constitution clothes
the governor with no judicial power nor does it
authorize him either to transact or to direct the
transaction of such judicial business.13
Justice Freebourn,

in a separate opinion,

stated

that he believed section 93-312 was unconstitutional but,
since the court in the Smith case had held the section to
be constitutional and operative, he believed the executive
orders of the governor were "justified and proper."^^
Justice Angstman,

in a nother separate dissenting

opinion, disagreed with the majority because he believed
they had m i sa p pl i ed the facts to the law.

He argued that

the g o v e r n o r ’s orders did neither "divest Judge Bennett of

authority or jurisdiction over cases in which he /had not
been7 disqualified" no r did it force Judge Bennett to stand
aside "while others take over his

o f f i c e . " ^ 5

Justice

Angstman concluded his dissent by a r guing that since the
executive orders did not divest Judge Bennett of his

authority to hear and decide those cases in which he had
not been disqualified, and since it did not force him to
stand aside in his own court, the governor’s executive
orders were within the scope of section 93-312.
13123 Mont. 436.
^^123 Mont.

440.

1^123 Mont.

440.
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Summary

Both the Smith and Bennett decisions have ruled
that the governor exceeded his statutory authority when
he called in a district judge.

In the Smith case, the

court held that one of the disqualified resident judges
should have called in another judge, instead of the
governor.

In the Bennett case, the court seems to have

said (1) that recourse should first be had to the super
visory power of the state supreme court, and (2) that if
the problem still persists after recourse has been had to
the state supreme court, then the governor can issue execu
tive orders calling in another judge, but the orders should
be limited so as not to divest the existing district judge
of his authority or jurisdiction in those cases which he
still has the authority and jurisdiction to hear.
For the purposes of this study, both the Smith
and Bennett decisions have, in the absence of clear consti
tutional or statutory direction, sustained the governor’s
power to call in a district judge under certain circum
stances,

Both decisions have upheld the constitutionality

of the statute giving this authority to the governor, al
though in both cases, the court has held that the governor’s
exercise of this authority was improper under the facts and
circumstances of the cases.

In both cases, the Montana

supreme court has held that the governor’s attempted
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exercise of this statutory authority was excessive and
transgressed into the performance of the judicial function
which is the domain of the state judiciary.

The court in

both decisions has attempted to adhere to the doctrine of
separation of powers by holding that the judicial function
should be performed by the judiciary, unless there is a
specific grant of judicial power to another branch of
government by the constitution or statute.
This whole problem of the governor calling in a
district judge might be resolved and the administration of
justice advanced if the power was placed in the hands of
the state supreme court and taken completely out of the
governor's scope of responsibility.

No valid reason is

apparent why this judicial function should be vested in
the governor, when it appears that the Montana supreme
court might perform this function equally well without
raising questions of separation of powers.

Modern notions

of judicial administration would strengthen the responsi
bility of the highest court for the general administration
1A
of the state judicial system.

^^See David R. Mason and William F. Crowley,
”A Proposal to Modernize Montana's Judicial System,"
Montana Public Affairs Report (Missoula: Bureau of Government Research, University of Montana, February 19 6 B ).
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The Power to Approve State Contracts
The Hogan Case
The only Montana supreme court decision to consider
the governor’s power to approve contracts was State ex rel.
State Publishing Company v. Hogan,^^ in which the court
held that contracts for state printing are invalid unless
signed by the governor when the state constitution and
statutes require such written approval by the governor.
The constitutional provision involved in the case
read in part:
. . , and the printing, and binding and distribu
tion of the laws, journals, and department reports
and other printing and binding . . . shall be per
formed under contract, to be given to the lowest
responsible bidder. * , . No member . . . of the
government shall be in any way interested in any
such contract; and all such contracts shall be
subject to the approval of the governor and state
treasurer. °
The statutory provision required that "all contracts made
by the board must be approved by the governor and the state
t r e a s u r e r ^ On December 20, 1Ô9Ô, the state board of
examiners awarded a printing contract to the State Pub
lishing Company which had submitted the lowest and best bid
for certain printing.

However, Secretary of State Hogan

refused to deliver the papers to be printed on the grounds
1722 Mont. 3Ô4, 56 P. 8lS (1899).
I^Mont, Const., Art. V, sec. 30.
^^Mont. Codes Ann,, sec, 710 (Booth 1895).
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that the Montana constitution and statutes required that
all contracts entered into by the state board of examiners
for such printing and binding were subject to the approval
of the governor and state treasurer.
The three-man court, in a Per Curiam opinion, held
that the governor* s approval was an indispensible element
of the contract and that there could be no valid and en
forceable contract between the parties until the governor
had approved the contract.

The court perceived this con

tract approval power to be similar to the governor*s veto
power and concluded that this approval power exists as **a
check upon possible extravagances of the Board of Exami
ners.**^^
Summary
The establishment of this contract approval power
in the governor, both by the constitution and by statute,
has added to the powers of the state chief executive.

The

Montana supreme court through the Hogan decision has sus
tained this grant since the court held that the governor’s
approval is an indispensible element to such a contract.
The decision placed the responsibility for reviewing and
approving such state contracts squarely on the shoulders
of the chief executive.
^°22 Mont. 390.
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For the purposes of this study, the Hogan decision
has no special interest since the court rendered the deci
sion on the basis of clear constitutional and statutory
direction which required no interpretative function.
The Discretionary Extradition Power
The Booth Case
The only Montana supreme court decision concerning
the governor's discretionary extradition power was State v.
Booth,

21

in which the court held in part that the motives

which induce a governor to act on a requisition for a war
rant for extradition are not reviewable in a habeas corpus
proceeding.
The governor of Oregon requested the governor of
Montana to issue a warrant for the extradition of Booth.
Thereafter, Booth was detained by virtue of the Montana
governor's warrant whereupon, on August 13» 1957, he
petitioned a district court for a writ of habeas corpus
alleging, among other things, that the application for his
extradition had not been made in good faith by the state
of Oregon.
Chief Justice Harrison noted that "where a warrant
of extradition is sought for some ulterior purpose . . .
is within the discretionary power of the governor of the
^^134 Mont. 235, 32Ô P.2d 1104 (195Ô).
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state to refuse to issue it.”^^

But the chief justice

held
. . . the motives which induced a governor to
grant, honor or refuse a requisition will not
be inquired into on habeas corpus, since such
inquiry would be opposed to principles of public
policy and to the freedom of action by the execu
tive within its constitutional a u t h o r i t y . 23
Summary
In the Booth decision, the Montana supreme court
exercised a mode of interpretation, in the absence of
clear constitutional or statutory direction, which
strengthened the powers of the Montana governor since it
has noted that the governor has the right and responsi
bility to exercise his discretion in extradition matters.
But even more important, it strengthened the powers of the
governor since it has held that the courts will not look
into the motives of the executive when he exercises his
discretion in granting or denying a requisition for extra
dition.
^^134 Mont. 247. For a discussion of the duty of
the governor of the asylum state to determine whether a
crime has been charged, see 40 ALR 2d 1155» sec. 3»
23-134 Mont. 247. For an additional discussion of
this subject, see 94 ALR 1493 *
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The Po w e r to P r o c l a i m Elections
Introduction
A M o n t a n a statute prov ides that the govern or must
give notice b y p r o c l am a ti o n to the electorate of certain
impending e l e c t i o n s , W i t h

reference to this power the

Montana supreme court has held that insufficiency of notice
by the go v e r n o r to the electorate in a general election
will not affect the v a lidity of the election.

In addition,

the court has held that i n sufficiency of notice in a
special election to fill a vacancy wi ll not affect the
e l e c t i o n ’s validity.

Thus,

for b o th general and special

elections the court has held that insufficiency of notice
will not affect the e l e c t i o n ’s v a l i d i t y . T h i s

issue of

the g o v e r n o r ’s e le ction procla ma t io n power has been before
the Montana su preme court on three different occasions:
twice directly,

and once quite indirectly.
The B re e n Case

The subject of the g o v e r n o r ’s election proclamation
power first arose
Toole.Since

indire ct l y in State ex rel. Breen v.

the case wa s a m a ndamus action to compel the

^^Mont. Rev. Codes,

sec.

23-103

(1947).

^^For a short i nt r od u ct o ry discus s io n of the effects
of notice by p r o c l a m a t i o n , see note in 120 Am, St. Rep. 794

(1 90 8 ).
Mont.

4,

79 P. 403

(1905).
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governor to issue a certificate of election to Breen, the
court decided the case on the merits of the question
whether the writ of mandamus should be issued and did not
resolve the proclamation issue: the effect of the governor’s
proclamation which had called for an election of two judges
from the second judicial district instead of three.
On May 4, 1901, the governor appointed McClernan to
fill the vacancy in one of the judgeships of the second
judicial district.

At the next election in November, 1901,

McClernan was elected to fill the remaining term of the
judgeship.

Later in November, 1904, there were six candi

dates for the three judgeships; Breen polled the third
highest number of votes, and thereafter demanded that the
governor issue him a commission as judge.
Breen argued that all the terms for district judge
were uniform, and thus all three judgeships were up for
election in 1904; therefore, as a consequence, since he
received the third highest number of votes, he was entitled
to a commission for the third judgeship.

The state, how

ever, argued that Breen had not alleged and proven that
there was a candidate for the third judgeship— McClernan*s
judgeship— and therefore the governor could not be com
pelled to issue a certificate of election for the third
judgeship since Breen had not proven that he had a clear
and legal right to it.
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The court conceded two points with reference to
Breen^s argument: first, there was a strong constitutional
basis for the argument that the terms of the three judge
ships were uniform; and second, that the formalities of
notice are not binding in a general election.

Thus, the

court admitted that the proclamation was not binding on
the election since it was a general election.

However, at

this point, the court dropped the proclamation issue since
it was not controlling for the central issue of granting
the writ of mandamus.

The court held that the writ of

mandamus should not be issued against the governor since
Breen had failed to show that he had a clear legal right
in the commission in order to justify the issuance of the
writ against the governor.

In other words, the court held

that Breen had failed to show that he was a candidate for
the third judgeship, and therefore he had not shown that
he had a legal right in the commission.
The Patterson Case
The second Montana supreme court decision to dis
cuss the governor's election proclamation power was State
ex rel. Patterson v. Lentz,

in which the court held that

insufficiency of notice in the governor’s proclamation of
^'^50 Mont. 322, U 6 P. 932 (1915).
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a v ac a nc y in the office of district judge would not invali
date the special election to fill the judgeship when the
electorate had a ctual notice of the vacancy by means of the
c a n d i d a t e s ’ campaigns.
The facts w e r e that

in the g o v e r n o r ’s proclamation

calling for a g e ne r al election there was no reference to
the v a cancy in one of the district judgeships to be filled
by special election, but the pr oc lamation did state that,
among other officers, there was to be elected ”a district
judge in any judicial district where a vacancy may exist.”

2A

The court stated that the election to fill the
judgeship was a s p ecial election,

and therefore it was

"incumbent upon the g o vernor to include in his proclamation
specific me n ti o n of the fact that in a particular district”
an election was to be held.

29

In addition,

it went on to

state that the g o v e r n o r ’s proclam ation gave insufficient
notice to the people of the special election because it
"left the people in any district to ascertain for them
selves wh ether the e me r g e n c y existed requiring them to elect
a judge,

instead of i nf o rm i ng t h e m definitely that such an

emergency existed and that they should proceed with the

^^As quoted in 50 Mont.
Mont.

333»

343.
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election.”

30

However, even in view of this fact that the gover
nor’s proclamation was insufficient notice to the people,
the court held that after an election the rule requiring
official notice by publication is not as binding asbefore
the election.

After an election,

the court held that the

validity of the special election depends upon ’’whether the
electors generally had notice and generally indicated
their choice of candidates
. . . inasmuch as the people have the right to
choose officers to serve them no informality in
the election will suffice to defeat their will,
as expressed by their votes, if in fact it
appears that they had actual notice and did
indicate their c h o i c e . 32
The court held, as a consequence, that the insuf
ficiency of notice in the governor’s proclamation was not
sufficient to invalidate the special election since the
electors had actual notice through the candidates’ cam
paigns that a judgeship was vacant and up for election.
The Nordquist Case
The third Montana supreme court decision discussing
the governor’s election proclamation power was Nordquist v.
3O5O Mont. 345.
3150 Mont. 345.
^^50 Mont. 343.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

130

Ford,

33

in which the court held that the governor’s procla

mation did not have to make reference to a referendum: a
measure referred by the legislature to the people.
Nordquist sought to enjoin the governor from
issuing and selling bonds for the construction and repairs
at the state hospital.

Sale and issuance of bonds for

this purpose had been authorized by Chapter 168 of the
Laws of 1939, "which was an Act passed by the legislature
and by it referred to the people at the general election
in 1940."^^
Nordquist claimed that the failure to publish the
governor’s proclamation with mention of Chapter 168 invali
dated the law, and therefore the governor should be en
joined from the issuance and sale of the bonds under the
law.

Justice Angstman held:
, . . under the law there is no requirement that
the Governor’s proclamation make any reference
to a measure referred by the legislature to the
people. Obviously if the proclamation need make
no reference to /such7 referendum measures, then
failure to publish the proclamation becomes im
material so far as this point is c o n c e r n e d . 35

The court thus held that référendums need not be incorpor
ated into the governor’s proclamation, and therefore need
^^112 Mont. 278, 114 P.2d 1071 (1941).
34i12 Mont. 280.
35i i 2 Mont. 283.
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not be published throughout the state.
Summary
The Montana supreme court on three separate
occasions has discussed the Montana governor’s election
proclamation power. The first discussion was in the Breen
case in which the court implied, as dictum, that when the
time and place of an election are fixed by statute, as
they are in a general election, the existence of the
statute is notice to all the electors of the election,
and therefore the failure of the governor to give complete
notice by proclamation as required by law does not invali
date the election.

This dictum seems to weaken the elec

tion proclamation power of the governor since the court
defines the nature of this power as directory and minis
terial, and not mandatory and discretionary.

However,

this power should only be directory and ministerial.
is not a major power of the governor.

This

Neither should the

statute impose a mandatory obligation on the governor, nor
should the governor be able to defeat a general election
if the power is improperly exercised.
The Patterson case held that insufficiency of notice
in the governor’s proclamation was not sufficient to invali
date a special election to fill a vacancy when the electors
had actual notice of the election by means of the
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candidates* campaigns.

Again it could be argued that this

holding weakens the governor*s election proclamation power
since it fails to impose a mandatory obligation on the
governor to perform his duty of giving proper notice.

How

ever, this power should not be binding on the governor.
Even in a special election, it should not be binding if
the electors had

actual notice.

ThePatterson decision

gives the better

rule since it holds that the lack of

statutory notice

by proclamation to fill a vacancyin a

special election

does not invalidate that election if the

electors had actual notice of the election.
The third discussion was in the Nordquist case
which held that the governor*s proclamation did not have
to make reference to any referendum.

This case also

affects the governor's power, but not in the same manner
as the first two cases.

They weakened the governor's

power by holding that his statutory obligation to provide
notice was not mandatory; whereas the Nordquist case
weakens the governor's power by holding that all things to
be voted on in an election need not be stated in the
proclamation.
Although it can be argued that these decisions
weaken the governor's election proclamation power, this
study agrees with the court that the duty and responsi
bility of the governor to provide election notice should
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only be directory, not mandatory.

This formalistic power

should neither impose a mandatory obligation of the
governor nor be essential to the conduct of a valid elec
tion.

To impose a meticulous observance of detail as to

all elements in elections on the governor would not really
strengthen the governorship.

In addition, to invalidate

an election for a minor formal failure of such detail would
diminish popular control without any sensible increase of
gubernatorial authority.

In conclusion, this study recom

mends that this power and responsibility should be taken
out of the governor*s office and placed in the secretary
of state’s office since he is the major election officer
in Montana.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
The hypothesis of this study has been that the
Montana supreme court, when presented with a case or
controversy concerning the Montana governorship, in the
absence of clear constitutional or statutory direction
should exercise a mode of interpretation vAiich will
strengthen the office and powers of the Montana governor
since it is now desirable to have strong executives in
state government.

Thus, this study is an analysis of the

Montana governorship as seen through the eyes of the
Montana supreme court, tested against the assumed desir
ability of a particular mode of judicial interpretation.
A few of these decisions have dealt with important
powers of the governor and have raised significant issues;
others have dealt with relatively unimportant or minor
powers and have involved little interpretive function.
This might be expected since lawyers often must raise minor
issues to get their client ^s interest before the court.
This study has witnessed examples of this; notably most of
the cases raising the issue of the governor’s power to pro
claim a special session.

In these cases the issue was
134
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w h e t h e r the legislation w as w i th i n the call of the go v er 
n o r ’s p r o c l a m at i on or message.

In all but one of the cases,

the l egislation w a s clea rly wi t h i n the boundaries of the
g o v e r n o r ’s call,

and the court a ccordingly sustained the

g o v e r n o r ’s a u t h o r i t y to issue the call and to limit or
extend the bounda r ie s of the subject matter of that call.
Nevertheless,

the issue wa s raised by counsel as he argued

his c l i e n t ’s interest b efore the c o u r t .
A n o t h e r example would be the cases raising the
issue of the g o v e r n o r ’s pow er to p ro claim elections.
There counsel was reaching for an issue by raising the
question of w h e t h e r the election had been mentioned in the
election proclamation.
This study has examined 38 cases and 26 proved to
be relevant for the hypothesis.

A few were important and

have been r e co g ni z ed nationally,

and therefore deserve

special attention.

These cases are: the Chumasero case

(mandamus), the V e t o case

(veto power), and the McDonald

case (militia p o w e r ) .
Still others w er e

important wi thin the state since

they have been c o n c e r n e d w i t h ma j or powers of the governor
and have been relevant for the s t u d y ’s hypothesis
Table 1).

These

cases include:

recognized a v ac a n c y that
torial appointment;

(see

the Jardine case, which

could be filled by g u b e r n a 

the Craighead

case, w h i c h provided
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that the governor could remove an appointee at will; the
Sullivan, Holt and Matson cases, which restricted the
governor*s removal power; the Livingstone case, which
applied the governor*s approval power to constitutional
amendments; the pardon power cases, which respected the
governor*s pardon power; the Herlihy case, which affirmed
the governor*s militia power while it defined limits of
liability; and the Lame y case, which established the right
of succession,
A student of state government would naturally
assume that state supreme courts would be more persuaded
and influenced by the concept of a strong governor as it
became more established and popularly believed by the
citizenry and public officials.

This would mean that as

the concept grew, so would the persuasive effect grow on
state supreme courts which would render decisions manifest
ing this concept.

The three most recent cases in this

study do indicate this trend: the Booth case (extradition
discretion), the Livingstone case (approval power), and
the Herman-Roy case (pardon power).

However, all three

of the Montana court *s more noted decisions which
strengthened the Montana governorship were rendered rela
tively early in the court *s history: the Chumasero case
(1Ô75), the McDonald case (1914), and the Veto case (1923).
This fact might be cited to support the notion that the
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court w a s as m u c h co n ce r n e d w i t h a st r o n g g o v e r n o r in the
e a r l y d a y s of s t a t e h o o d as it is n o w — Ô0 ye a rs l a t e r —
in the era of " c r e a t i v e fe d eralism,"^
The court,

obvious l y,

is not p r i m a r i l y r e s p o n 

s ible f or the fact th at M o n t a n a has a w e a k governorship.
The p r i m a r y so u r c e of w e a k e n e r s are the constitution,
l e g i s l a t i v e a s s e m b l y and p r a c t i c e of past governors;
ever,

this d o e s not

court can be f a u l t e d

exempt the

the
how

court f r o m an y fault.

in one ar e a especially,

The

the removal

p o w e r - - o n e of t h e g o v e r n o r ’s r e a l l y m a j o r and important
powers.

The

court has w e a k e n e d the g o v e r n o r ’s removal

p ower b y not a l l o w i n g the g o v e r n o r the right to remove
a p p o i n t e e s at will.
Thus,
the court,

i n co nclusion,

it has b e e n d e m o n s t r a t e d that

b o t h e a r l y in the s t a t e ’s h i st o ry and more

s i g n i f i c a n t l y in re c e n t years,
i nt e rp r e t a t i o n ,

in t he a b s e n c e of cle ar c o ns t itutional or

statutory direction,
ship.

Howe ver,

has e x er c is e d a mode of

to s t r e n g t h e n t he M o n t a n a g o v e r n o r 

it a l s o has b e en p roven that w i t h reference

to the r e m o v a l p o w e r t h r e e of the four decisions have
w e a k e n e d the M o n t a n a

go v e r n o r s h i p .

A p o p u l a r t e r m used d u r i n g the early years of
L yn d on B. J o h n s o n ’s p r e s i d e n c y to sy mbolize the "new"
federal-state relationship.
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^These three mandamus decisions strengthen the governorship to the
extent that they recognize executive discretion and will not control this
discretion by mandamus; however, they weaken the governorship to the extent
that they recognize that some executive actions are ministerial.
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^This decision neither strengthens or weakens the governorship since
its primary focus was on the length of the appointee’s term.
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^This décision with reference to the governor's proclamation power
neither strengthens nor weakens the power; however, with reference to the
use of mandamus to control executive action, this decision strengthens the
office of the governor.
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